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The Internally Displaced in International Law  
  
Do they Require Enhanced Protection? 
 
 
“If one considers how far the world community has journeyed since 
1989 it just might be possible that by the end of the 20th century the 
senseless abuse of people within borders will be a strictly historical 
phenomenon.”1





The image is familiar. A line of exhausted people dragging their possessions down a 
dirt road in an attempt to flee armed conflict, internal strife, ethnic tensions or large 
scale abuses of human rights. One usually associates refugees with this image. And 
indeed, in 1982, nine out of ten of these people were refugees while only one in ten 
represented an internally displaced person (IDP).2 At the time, the number of IDPs 
amounted to 1.2 million and 11 countries were reported to be affected by internal 
displacement.3  
In only 15 years, these figures had changed dramatically. By 1997, the 
number of IDPs had risen to over 20 million people, found in at least 35 countries.4 At 
the turn of the century, the number of IDPs had mushroomed again – this time to 
roughly 25 million.5 There it has remained without significant changes and today 
IDPs outnumber refugees by more than two to one.6 Some 50 countries are reported 
to be affected worldwide.7 Africa, where conflicts combined with poverty abound 
more than anywhere else in the world, is the continent most burdened by internal 
displacement. It hosts an IDP population of over 13 million in 19 of its countries.8  
                                                 
1 Scheffer ‘Toward a Modern Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention’ (1992) 23 U. Tol. L. Rev. 293. 
2 Mass Exoduses and Displaced Persons, Report of the Representative of the Secretary-General on 
Internally Displaced Persons, Francis M. Deng, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2003/86 para. 4. 
3 Mass Exoduses and Displaced Persons (no. 2) para. 4. 
4 Cohen & Deng The Forsaken People 1.   
5 Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), Global Statistics available at www.internal-
displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpPages)/22FB1D4E2B196DAA802570BB005E787C?Open
Document&count=1000.  
6 Mass Exoduses and Displaced Persons (no. 2) para. 4. 
7 Mass Exoduses and Displaced Persons (no. 2) para. 4. 




However, internal displacement can by no means be labeled an African 
problem. In Latin America 3.7 million people are internally displaced, in Asia and the 
Pacific the number reaches 3.3 million, Europe has an IDP population of 3 million 
and in the Middle East over 2 million displaced can be counted at present.9 Thus, it is 
safe to say that the crisis of internal displacement is global in dimension. 
The enormous increase in numbers is, at least in part, deemed to be a 
consequence of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the subsequent end of the Cold 
War.10 Conflicts that had previously been suppressed by the superpowers resurfaced 
and the number of civil wars, triggering displacement, ballooned.11 It is also 
considered to be a result of increasing reluctance to grant asylum, on the part of 
refugee receiving nations.12 As more and more people tried to seek asylum the 
attitude towards refugees changed. They were suddenly perceived and depicted as 
threats to the financial, cultural and moral standing of a country. Over time, more 
restrictive asylum policies have been pursued which now further internal 
displacement.13  
Forced to leave their homes, land and belongings behind, IDPs are a 
particularly vulnerable group of victims of conflict or abuse. Some even contend that 
they constitute the single largest at-risk population in the world.14 Displaced persons 
are frequently deprived of adequate shelter, food and health services.15 They also 
face poor prospects for employment and education.16 Moreover and in contrast to 
refugees, the internally displaced tend to remain close to or become trapped in zones 
of conflict.17 This increases the risk of physical assault, sexual violence, abduction 
and forced conscription, to name only a few of the horrors they face. Not surprisingly, 
the internally displaced suffer significantly higher rates of mortality than the general 
population.18
                                                 
9 IDMC Global Statistics (no. 5). 
10 Freedman ‘International Intervention to Combat the Explosion of Refugees and Internally Displaced 
Persons’ (1995) 6 Geo. Immigr. L. J. 565. See also: Mass Exoduses and Displaced Persons (no. 2) 
para. 8 
11 Freedman (no. 10) 565; Mass Exoduses and Displaced Persons (no. 2) para. 8.  
12 Phuong The International Protection of Internally Displaced Persons 4. 
13 Freedman (no. 10) 566. 
14 Korn Exodus within Borders 2; Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, Global Statistics (no. 5).  
15 Mass Exoduses and Displaced Persons (no. 2) para. 5. 
16 Korn (no. 14) 16. 
17 Mass Exoduses and Displaced Persons (no. 2) para. 5. 
18 Toole & Waldman ‘The Public Health Aspects of Complex Emergencies and Refugee Situations’ 
(1997) 18 Annual Rev. Public Health 289-291. 
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Despite the alarming number of IDPs and their heightened vulnerability they 
enjoy no specific legal protection under international law. In this respect the internally 
displaced are distinct from refugees who are protected through the 1951 Refugee 
Convention19 and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees.20 At first this 
may seem surprising as both groups are forced to leave their homes and 
communities behind and subsequently face similar problems. However, a person can 
only obtain the status of refugee by crossing a state border.21 The internally 
displaced have, by definition, not crossed the border into another country, thus 
remain excluded from the refugee protection regime. 
As a result, they depend on their own governments to protect and assist them. 
However, these governments are often unable or unwilling to provide the necessary 
assistance and in some cases even constitute the source of displacement.22 This 
leaves IDPs with nothing but the international community to turn to. In the eyes of the 
international community, however, internal displacement has long been perceived as 
a matter falling within the realm of state sovereignty.23 The principle of state 
sovereignty, which denotes that a state has full and unchallengeable authority over 
its territory and all the persons therein, affords governments wide leeway when it 
comes to the treatment of people within the state.24 Seen as a purely internal matter, 
displacement was felt to be beyond international scrutiny. 
This attitude has only changed over the last two decades, when IDPs virtually 
forced themselves into the attention of the international community. Due to their 
growing numbers and their enormous suffering, an international community, who had 
already taken up the task to promote and protect human rights, could no longer 
ignore the plight of the internally displaced.25   
                                                 
19 Refugee Convention available at www.unhcr.ch/html/menu3/b/o_c_ref.htm.   
20 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees available at www.unhcr.ch/html/menu3/b/o_p_ref.htm. 
The Refugee Convention is only applicable to people fleeing events which occurred in Europe before 
1 January 1951. Article 1 (2) of the Protocol deleted the temporal and territorial limitations, thus, 
broadened its scope.  
21 See Article 1 A. (2) of the Refugee Convention. 
22 Cohen ‘International Protection for Internally Displaced Persons’ at 18 in Human Rights: An Agenda 
for the Next Century. 
23 Deng ’International Response to Internal Displacement: A Revolution in the Making’ (2004) 11 No. 3 
Hum. Rts. Brief 24. 
24 Dixon International Law 144. 
25 Article 1 (3) of the U.N. Charter reads:  
“The Purposes of the United Nations are to achieve international cooperation … in promoting and 
encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinctions as to 
race, sex, language or religion.”  
   Article 55 (c) of the U.N. Charter reads: 
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This work will examine the situation of the internally displaced from the 
perspective of international law. Chapter one will provide a brief outline of how the 
meaning of the term IDP developed26 and then explain who, in the context of this 
paper, is covered by the term IDP. Chapter two will then put forth the legal framework 
applicable to IDPs and examine whether these rules grant sufficient protection. 
Chapter three will address if and how the international community can enhance    
their protection. In this context it must be explored whether the principle of state 
sovereignty still presents a serious challenge to the ability of the international 
community to intervene on behalf of the internally displaced. Finally, the focus will 
turn to the situation in the Sudan. It is the country with the largest population of IDPs, 
estimated at over five million.27 The example of the Sudan will provide insight into the 
causes of displacement, the needs of the displaced and whether they receive 


















                                                                                                                                                        
“The United Nations shall promote universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and 
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion.”. 
26 As to date no formal legal definition of the term IDP exists. Thus, the outline will refer to what can be 
called a descriptive definition.  
27 IDMC Global Statistics (estimating 5.355.000 million IDPs in Sudan, August 2005) (no. 5) .  
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Chapter I  
 
Defining ‘Internally Displaced Persons’ 
 
1. Overview of the Ongoing Controversy 
 
In the early 1990s, a decade after the dimensions of internal displacement were first 
assessed, the issue emerged onto the international agenda. In March 1991, the 
United Nations Commission on Human Rights called upon the Secretary-General to 
prepare a report on internal displacement which then triggered more active 
involvement by the U.N. on the issue.28 It led, for example, to the appointment of a 
Special Representative on Internally Displaced Persons who was given the mandate 
to analyse the normative framework of protection applicable to the situation of 
internal displacement and also to suggest appropriate action.29  
Establishing the internally displaced as a category of international concern 
brought about a need to define who is included in this category. At the time, a 
working definition, put forth by the Secretary-General, existed. It defined IDPs as:  
 
‘Persons or groups who have been forced to flee their homes 
suddenly or unexpectedly in large numbers, as a result of armed 
conflict, internal strife, systematic violations of human rights or natural 
or man-made disaster, and who are within the territory of their own 
country.’30
 
However, this definition has been criticized for numerous reasons. On the one 
hand, it was perceived as too narrow mainly because of its temporal (‘suddenly and 
unexpectedly’) and numerical (‘in large numbers’) criteria.31 Restricting the definition 
to those who fled their homes ‘suddenly or unexpectedly’ ignored displacement which 
was not spontaneous but rather the result of an organized state policy implemented 
over years or possibly even decades.32 Under the military junta in Burma, for 
example, hundreds of thousands were forcibly removed, at times with considerable 
                                                 
28 CHR Res. 1991/25; Analytical Report of the Secretary-General on IDPs U.N. Doc E/CN.4/1992/23. 
29 U.N. Doc A/48/579 (1993) para. 4. 
30 Analytical Report of the Secretary-General on IDPs U.N. Doc E/CN.4/23 (1992). 
31 Mooney ‘The Concept of Internal Displacement and the Case for Internally Displaced Persons as a 
Category of Concern’ (2005) 24 No. 3 Ref. Surv. Q. 11. 
32 Mooney (no. 31) 11. 
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advance notice.33 In Iraq, internal displacement is largely the result of 30 years of 
state policies of expulsion of groups, particularly ethnic Kurds, Assyrians and 
Turkmen, which were considered "disloyal" to various Iraqi regimes.34  
 By requiring that the displaced fled ‘in large numbers’ the definition ignored 
that in reality many of them flee in smaller numbers, sometimes even on an individual 
basis. In Colombia, for example, people purposely flee in small numbers hoping to 
remain inconspicuous.35 Furthermore, it was argued that the numerical criterion 
would give rise to an element of imprecision since determining what exactly is a large 
number involves a subjective evaluation.36
 On the other hand, the definition was considered too broad. The main criticism 
toward this end was aimed at the inclusion of natural or man-made disaster as a 
separate cause of displacement. It was contended that such cases of displacement 
hardly result in a state depriving its citizens of assistance and protection.37 Usually, 
the opposite is the case. States make their own resources available and routinely call 
for support from the international community if they cannot cope with the disaster 
alone.38  
Another argument against including disaster is the apparent lack of a coercive 
element on the part of the authorities or others in power, which underlies all other 
causes listed in the definition.39 Even though persons displaced by disaster leave 
their homes involuntarily, the force that drives them to do so is of a very different 
nature from that in the other situations of displacement.  
In addition to the criticism voiced with regard to certain elements of the 
definition, Luke Lee – Special Advisor to the US Department of State, put forward the 
proposal to abandon it altogether.40 Instead of two separate definitions, one for the 
internally and one for the externally displaced, he advocated to include all the 
displaced in one definition, regardless of whether they happened to be within or 
                                                 
33 Korn (no. 14) 12. 
34 Cohen ’Status of Internal Displacement in Iraq’ IRIN News, 21 May 2004, availabe at 
www.brook.edu/fp/projects/idp/20040521cohen.htm  
35 Korn (no. 14) 12. 
36 Comprehensive Study Prepared by the Representative of the Secretary-General on the Human 
Rights Issues Related to IDPs U.N. Doc E/CN.4/1993/35 para. 35. 
37 Lewis ‘Dealing with the Problem of Internally Displaced Persons’ (1992) 6 Geo.Immigr.L.J. 694. 
38 Lewis (no. 37) 694. 
39 Koskinen ’Internally Displaced Persons and the Right to Housing and Property Restitution’ 13 
available at www.abo.fi/instut/imr/degree_programmes/norfa/paivi.pdf. ’See also ‘Are International 
Institutions Doing Their Job: Forced Movement of Peoples: Discussion’ (1996) 90 Am. Soc’y Int’l L. 
Proc. 559. 
40 Lee ‘Internally Displaced Persons and Refugees: Toward a Legal Synthesis’ (1996) 9 J.Ref.S. 27. 
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outside their country.41 The reason for eliminating the border-crossing element was 
his conviction that it created an unwarranted distinction in the standard of human 
rights protection between refugees and IDPs.  
However, crossing a border means that the person is subject to a different 
sovereign entity, whose obligations to an “outsider” are founded on a different legal 
basis from the one which a state owes its own citizens. As Phuong observed 
correctly, the protection given to refugees is a surrogate protection for persons who 
lost the protection from their own country while the protection of IDPs is of 
complementary nature and only needed when the national protection is insufficient or 
unavailable.42
 The definition which eventually emerged after six years of deliberation is 
contained in the introduction to the 1998 Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement 
(Guiding Principles). 
 
‘Persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to 
flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in 
particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed 
conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights 
or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an 
internationally recognized state border.’43
 
Notably, the temporal and numerical qualifications have been deleted from 
the definition. However, no change was made with respect to natural or man-made 
disaster as a cause of displacement. On the contrary, the 1998 definition even 
expanded the possible causes by providing a non-exhaustive list through the words 
“in particular”.  
Although the Guiding Principles have gained wide recognition as a tool for 
addressing internal displacement it would be bold to say that the definition therein 
has been fully accepted.44 The lack of acceptance for what comes rather close to a 
catch all phrase is reflected in the global statistics on internal displacement which 
count only those uprooted by conflict and human rights violations.45 The 
incorporation of persons displaced by disaster has also been rejected in one of the 
                                                 
41 Lee (no. 40) 36-40. 
42 Phuong (no. 12) 25. 
43 Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement U.N. Doc E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2. 
44 An account for their recognition will be given later on. 
45 See, for example, IDMC Global Statistics (no. 5). Notably, the Reports of the Representative on 
IDPs use and rely on these numbers as well, thus, do not include disaster displaced. 
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most recent studies on internal displacement, for essentially the same arguments 
that were advanced earlier in this section.46
Notwithstanding its common use, the broad definition of the term IDP has 
attracted criticism and cannot be regarded as completely accepted. In an 
acknowledgement of this criticism, this paper will rely on a narrower definition. 
 
2. Meaning of the Term in the Present Context 
 
In the context of this work the term IDP shall not refer to persons displaced by 
natural or man-made disaster. The key issue which renders IDPs a category of 
utmost concern to the international community is their vulnerable position. Although 
disaster displaced persons may well be vulnerable they do not face threats, such as 
physical attacks, sexual assault, abduction or forcible recruitment, constantly faced 
by persons displaced because of armed conflict or massive human rights abuses. 
Because of the different causes of suffering, remedies will naturally differ. Moreover, 
when it comes to the root causes and how they can be prevented, different 
prevention strategies are required if prevention is possible at all – natural disasters 
may prove to be beyond the realm of prevention.  
Here, the term IDP will refer to persons who, as a result of armed conflict, 
internal strife or gross human rights violations, have been forced to flee or leave their 










                                                 
46 Developing DFID’s Policy Approach to Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons: Consultancy 
Report and Policy Recommendations – Vol.1 (Refugees Studies Centre, University of Oxford, 






International Legal Framework Applicable to IDPs and Its Protection Gaps 
 
As pointed out earlier, IDPs do not benefit from a specific regime of legal protection. 
However, this does not mean that international law provides them with no protection. 
Most cases of internal displacement coincide with situations of armed conflict, which 
prompt the applicability of international humanitarian law.47 Furthermore, IDPs are 
entitled to the protection of the expansive body of international human rights law, 
since human rights, being the birthrights of all human beings, apply to everyone 
without distinction.48 In addition, the rapidly developing body of international criminal 
law proscribes certain practices which time and again occur during situations of 
internal displacement. The first part of this chapter will take a closer look at the 
different branches of international law. The second part will examine whether they in 




1. Protection under International Humanitarian Law 
 
International humanitarian law, enshrined in the four Geneva Conventions49 and 
their two Additional Protocols,50 regulates which conduct is permissible in times of 
armed conflict. Its main purpose is to minimize the effects of violence stemming from 
such conflict on the civilian population.51 How this is accomplished with regard to the 
internally displaced will be explored below. In this context, one must bear in mind 
that humanitarian law deals with two distinct situations, international and internal 
                                                 
47 Lavoyer ‘Protection under International Humanitarian Law’ in Internally Displaced Persons 26. See 
also Phuong (no. 12) 41. 
48 See Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action U.N. Doc A/CONF.157/23 (12 July 1993) para. 1. 
See also Phuong (no. 12) 42. The fact that human rights apply equally to all individuals also derives 
from the wording of the human rights instruments (‘all human beings’ ’everyone’ ‘no one’). 
49 The Geneva Conventions were adopted on 12 August 1949, entry into force on 21 October 1950. 
For the purpose of this work the fourth Geneva Convention relative to the protection of civilian persons 
in time of war will be of specific relevance.  
50 Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 relates to the protection of victims of 
international armed conflict, Protocol II Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 relates to the 
protection of victims of non-international armed conflict, adopted on 8 June 1977, entry into force on 7 
December 1978. 
51 Lavoyer (no. 47) 27. 
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armed conflict, which are governed by different rules. The protection afforded to the 
internally displaced, thus, varies depending on the situation that triggers 
displacement.   
 
1.1. Protection during International Armed Conflict 
 
According to Article 2 common to the four Geneva Conventions an international 
armed conflict involves a declaration of war. In the absence of such a declaration, 
any confrontation involving armed force between two or more states is deemed 
international armed conflict.52 With the end of the Cold War, the number of 
international armed conflicts has declined considerably.53 However, they have not 
vanished completely. The conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea is only one example 
of an inter-state conflict that has generated substantial internal displacement.54 The 
rules that pertain to the protection of civilians during an international armed conflict 
are enshrined in the fourth Geneva Convention. Notably, and to the detriment of the 
internally displaced, most of them were designed for non-nationals. Article 4 of the 
fourth Geneva Convention provides:  
 
‘Persons protected by the Convention are those who, at a given 
moment and in any manner whatsoever, find themselves, in case 
of conflict or occupation, in the hands of a party to the conflict or 
occupying power of which they are not nationals.’ 
 
 As a result, most provisions contained in the fourth Geneva Convention are 
not applicable to IDPs who stay in areas controlled by their own government. This is 
unfortunate as some of these provisions address the most urgent needs of displaced 
populations. Article 55, for example, stipulates the obligation to ensure the food and 
medical supplies of the population. Furthermore, Article 59 provides that in cases 
where the whole or part of the population is inadequately supplied, passage to 
humanitarian operations must be granted.  
                                                 
52 See common Article 2 of the Geneva Conventions. 
53 Korn (no. 14) 123. 
54 At the height of the 1998-2000 border war between the two countries over one million people were 
internally displaced on the Eritrean side of the disputed border. On the Ethiopian side, the number was 
estimated at over 300.000 people. These numbers have declined sharply after the two countries 
agreed to a cease-fire. However, acute tensions along the border have raised fears of renewed 
internal displacement in both countries. See IDMC Ethiopia and Eritrea country profiles as well as IDP 
News Alert: 17 November 2005 available at www.internal-displacement.org.    
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Only a few provisions contained in Part II of the fourth Geneva Convention 
have a broader applicability as Part II ‘covers the whole of the population of the 
countries in conflict.’55 They provide for, inter alia, the protection of the wounded, 
sick, infirm and expectant mothers56 and measures related to child welfare.57  
 Moreover, Additional Protocol I becomes operative in situations of inter-state 
conflicts. It abandons the concept of protected persons used in the fourth Geneva 
Convention and instead opts for an all-encompassing notion of civilian, as 
distinguished only from combatant.58 Therefore, all the provisions aimed at the 
protection of the civilian population are applicable to IDPs. They are contained in 
Part IV of Protocol I and provide, in substance, many of the safeguards that, under 
the fourth Geneva Convention, are only provided to protected persons.  
 
1.2. Protection during Internal Armed Conflict 
 
A situation can be classified as an internal armed conflict when government forces 
fight dissident forces within national territory and the fighting reaches a certain level 
of intensity.59 Mere acts of banditry or unorganized and short-lived rebellions are not 
covered under humanitarian law.60 Compared to international armed conflicts, 
internal armed conflicts are subject to a more limited legal regime.61 In a time where 
most of the conflicts that lead to massive displacement take place within the borders 
of a state, this is regrettable.62  
In fact, the only applicable provision out of the four Geneva Conventions is 
common Article 3. Notably, it binds every party to the conflict and applies to the 
entire civilian population.63 First and foremost, Article 3 guarantees humane 
treatment which has to be afforded without discrimination. However, it does not 
define what constitutes humane treatment. It only provides a short list of acts which 
                                                 
55 See Article 13 of the fourth Geneva Convention. 
56 See Articles 16, 18 – 22 of the fourth Geneva Convention. 
57 See Article 24 of the fourth Geneva Convention. 
58 Provost International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law 40. See also: Article 50 of Protocol I. 
59 Greenwood Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflicts 47. 
60 Pictet Commentary IV 36. 
61 Greenwood (no. 59) 49. 
62 Cohen & Deng (no. 4) 5; Phuong (no. 12) 45. 
63 See Article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions and Pictet Commentary IV 34. 
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are incompatible with humane treatment. Article 3 prohibits, inter alia, violence to life 
and person, in particular murder, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture.64  
Despite its vagueness common Article 3 is of utmost importance for the 
protection of the internally displaced because it enshrines customary international 
law.65 This is significant because once a rule becomes a rule of customary 
international law, states are bound regardless of whether they have ratified a treaty 
regarding the rule in question or not.66 As a consequence, all states are bound by 
the fundamental guarantees contained in common Article 3. 
 Besides common Article 3 the Additional Protocol II becomes applicable 
during non-international armed conflicts. It is the only international agreement which 
deals exclusively with the conduct of the parties to an internal conflict.67 It offers 
more detailed rules than common Article 3 but, at the same time, is of a more limited 
applicability.68 The latter is due to a number of requirements which confine the 
applicability of Protocol II to a virtual civil war situation.69  
Protocol II explicitly prohibits acts such as rape and enforced prostitution.70 It 
also provides that children shall, inter alia, receive an education and be spared from 
recruitment in the armed forces if under the age of fifteen.71 These provisions are of 
particular importance because women and children constitute the overwhelming 
majority of the internally displaced and are worst affected by displacement.72  
                                                 
64 See Article 3 common to all four Geneva Conventions. 
65 Meron Human Rights and Humanitarian Norms as Customary Law 34. The ICJ held in Military and 
Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua that common Article 3 represents a ‘minimum 
yardstick’ also in international armed conflicts and reflects ‘elementary considerations of humanity’ 
(1968) ICJ Reports 14 para. 218. It, thus, broadened the applicability of common Article 3 and 
classified it as customary international law – the only law it could apply to the case because a 
multilateral treaty reservation of the United States precluded it from applying the Geneva Conventions 
as treaties. See also: Prosecutor v Akayesu Case No. ICTR-96-4-T available at www.ictr.org.  
66 Meron (no. 65) 3. 
67 Green The Contemporary Law of Armed Conflict 61. 
68 Provost (no. 58) 261. 
69 Article 1 of Protocol II reads: “This Protocol … shall apply to armed conflicts … which take place in 
the territory of a High Contracting Party between its armed forces and dissident armed forces or other 
organized armed groups, which under responsible command, exercise such control over part of its 
territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military operations and to implement 
this Protocol.” See also Provost who contends that for its high threshold Protocol II can be considered 
a regression (no. 58) 261-264. 
70 See Article 4 (1) of Protocol II. 
71 See Article 4 (3) of Protocol II 
72 Korn (no. 14) 14-17. In situations of internal armed conflict men often join or are drafted into the 
fighting ranks. Others are killed while again others flee to avoid their recruitment. Women and children 
are left defenseless. Many children are separated from their mothers due to the upheaval caused by 
their flight. 
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Last but not least, Article 17 of Protocol II is of special relevance to IDPs. It 
states: 
 
‘1. The displacement of the civilian population shall not be ordered 
for reasons related to the conflict unless the security of the civilians 
involved or imperative military reasons so demand. Should such 
displacements have to be carried out, all possible measures shall 
be taken in order that the civilian population may be received under 
satisfactory conditions of shelter, hygiene, health, safety and 
nutrition. 
2. Civilians shall not be compelled to leave their own territory for 
reasons connected with the conflict.’ 
 
In sum, humanitarian law largely covers IDPs under the rules pertaining to 
civilians and provides for their protection concerning basic needs such as safety and 
subsistence. 
 
2. Protection under International Human Rights Law 
 
While international humanitarian law is only applicable in situations that qualify as 
armed conflict, international human rights law is of broader applicability. First of all, it 
applies alongside humanitarian law. Moreover, it provides protection in situations 
that fall short of armed conflict but involve violence and other repressive measures. 
These situations are often referred to as situations of tension and disturbance or 
internal strife. They include riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence as well as 
violent ethnic conflicts not amounting to hostilities.73 A great number of the internally 
displaced live in these situations which involve, by their very nature, certain human 
rights violations.74
Human rights law developed at great speed after the end of the Second World 
War. Its rapid growth was prompted by the conviction that spelling out human rights 
and fundamental freedoms would contribute to preventing atrocities like the ones 
associated with the Second World War.75 Today a wide range of conventional and 
customary norms are in place to provide protection to all individuals.  
                                                 
73 Internally Displaced Persons, Compilation and Analysis of Legal Norms, Part I, U.N. Doc 
E/CN.4/1996/52/Add.2 para. 28. 
74 Phuong (no. 12) 42. 
75 Brownlie Principles of Public International Law 529. 
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The Universal Declaration of Human Rights,76 the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights77 and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights78 form the foundation of international human rights protection and 
are often referred to as the International Bill of Rights.79 The latter two elaborate the 
rights contained in the UDHR in more detail and in, at least theoretically, a legally 
enforceable manner.80 Other important instruments are, for example, the 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination81 
and the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Punishment.82 In addition to the international conventions, regional human rights 
instruments reinforce and enhance protection.83 To ensure the implementation of the 
above mentioned human rights standards, international and regional monitoring and 
enforcement bodies have been set up.84  
Finally, it is important to note that the vast majority of states and authoritative 
authors recognize that the fundamental principles of human rights form part of 
customary international law.85 Accordingly, it can be concluded that IDPs enjoy 







                                                 
76 GA Res. 217 A (III), 10 December 1948 (UDHR). It is noteworthy that the UDHR is not a legally 
binding instrument. It is rather meant to be ‘a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all 
nations.’ (Preamble of the UDHR). Enshrining a consensus on the content of internationally 
recognized rights owed to the whole of mankind, it is, however, of strong moral force. See: Smith 
International Human Rights 39-40. 
77 999 UNTS 171, 16 December 1966 (ICCPR). 
78 993 UNTS 3, 16 December 1966 (ICESCR). 
79 Smith (no. 76) 30. 
80 Smith (no. 76) 30. 
81 660 UNTS 195, 21 December 1965 (CERD). 
82 23 ILM 1027 and 24 ILM 535, 10 December 1984 (CAT). 
83 These are the European Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (213 UNTS 222, 
4 November 1950), the American Convention on Human Rights (1144 UNTS 123, 22 November 1969) 
and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (21 ILM 58, 27 June 1981). 
84 Many of the treaties provide for treaty-monitoring bodies (e.g. ICCPR, ICESCR, CAT and CERD). 
Through the European Court of Human Rights member states can be held accountable for violations 
of the rights set forth in the ECHR. Being confined to a more restricted role than its European 
counterpart the Inter American Court of Human Rights nonetheless has dealt with violations of human 
rights. See: Steiner & Alston International Human Rights in Context 881. 
85 Brownlie (no. 75) 535-536. 
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3. Protection under International Criminal Law 
 
International criminal law is a relatively new and still scant branch of international 
law.86 Apart from piracy, only war crimes were traditionally considered international 
crimes, thus, incurring individual criminal responsibility.87 It was the end of the 
Second World War that first triggered the development of new categories of 
crimes.88 The recent establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC) has 
been another driving force for the development of a body of international criminal 
rules.89  
According to the ICC Statute, which entered into force on 1 July 2002, the 
Court has jurisdiction over genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and (for 
the purpose of this work, of less relevance) the crime of aggression.90 Two 
categories of relevance to IDPs, namely crimes against humanity and war crimes, 
will be further considered below. 
 
3.1. Crimes Against Humanity 
 
The acts which constitute crimes against humanity, when committed as part of a 
widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, are spelled 
out in Article 7 of the ICC Statute. Not surprisingly, they include acts such as torture 
and rape. More notably, they also include deportation and forcible transfer of 
population which are defined as:  
 
‘Forced displacement of the persons concerned by expulsion  
or other coercive acts from the area in which they are lawfully 
present, without grounds permitted under international law.’91
 
While other acts are relevant for IDPs simply because they are part of the 
civilian population, this provision explicitly declares the practice of forcibly displacing 
a population punishable and is, thus, of extra importance for IDPs.  
                                                 
86 Cassese International Criminal Law 16-17. 
87 Jescheck’International Crimes’ in Encyclopedia of Public International Law 1119-1122. 
88 Cassese (no. 86) 16. 
89 Kaul ’The International Criminal Court – Current Perspective’ in International Criminal Law and the 
Current Development of Public International Law 15-16. See also: Cassese (no. 86) 19. 
90 See Article 5(1) of the ICC Statute. 
91 See Article 7(1)(d) of the ICC Statute. 
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3.2. War Crimes 
 
War crimes, in general, are serious violations of rules that govern conduct in 
armed conflicts. In the case of international armed conflicts, these crimes are 
provided for in the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol I. They are termed 
‘grave breaches’ and they have to be directed at protected persons.92 As explored 
earlier on, IDPs do not properly fit within concept of protected persons contained in 
Article 4 of the fourth Geneva Convention. Article 85 of the Additional Protocol I, 
however, provides that willfully making civilians the object of attack or launching 
indiscriminate attacks that affect the civilian population, with the knowledge that such 
an attack will cause excessive loss of life or injury, shall be regarded as grave 
breaches.93  
 In the case of internal armed conflict, serious violations of common Article 3 
and of the laws and customs applicable to internal conflict, such as intentionally 
attacking the civilian population, committing rape or enlisting children under the age 
of fifteen, constitute war crimes.94
 All in all, it can be said that outrages perpetrated against IDPs in times of 
armed conflict are not just prohibited by international humanitarian and human rights 
law but also punishable under international criminal law.95
 
In declaring certain acts that contravene fundamental obligations of international 
humanitarian and human rights law criminal and by making them punishable, 
international criminal law can serve as a powerful deterrent when it comes to the 
perpetration of such acts. In this way, it reinforces the protection that the two other 





                                                 
92 See Article 147 of the fourth Geneva Convention. 
93 See Article 85(3)(a)&(b) of Additional Protocol I. 
94 See Article 8 (2)(c)&(e) of the ICC Statute. See also: Cassese (no. 86) 56. 
95 It should be noted that international criminal law not only attributes responsibility to those who 
commit crimes but also to those who induce or attempt the commission of international crimes or aid, 




Thus far everything points toward a wide array of protection afforded to IDPs. The 
question that remains to be answered is whether this protection is indeed effective. 
The focus will now turn to potential protection gaps. 
 
1. Ratification Gaps 
 
One thing international legal instruments have in common is that they need to be 
ratified before their obligations are binding. In other words, the absence of 
ratifications results in a lack of protection. Hence, the instruments discussed in part 
one of this chapter will only provide effective protection to the internally displaced if 
ratified. 
 
1.1. International Humanitarian Law 
 
In the case of international humanitarian law, the problem of ratification gaps mainly 
arises in relation to the Additional Protocols since virtually all states have ratified the 
Geneva Conventions.96 Even though the Additional Protocols have attracted a 
substantial amount of ratifications they do not, at present, provide sufficient 
protection for all the internally displaced as a number of states that have not ratified 
them are host to large populations of IDPs, displaced as a result of armed conflict. A 
text book example is the Sudan, where internal armed conflict, stretching over more 
than two decades, has led to the displacement of millions.  
The inapplicability of the Additional Protocols considerably weakens the 
protection framework available to IDPs. As examined earlier on, it was Additional 
Protocol I that brought IDPs close to the status of protected persons which enjoy 
wide protection under the fourth Geneva Conventions.97 In the more common case 
of internal armed conflict IDPs will be unable to benefit from the detailed provisions 
                                                 
96 The Geneva Conventions have been ratified by 192 states. Additional Protocol I has been ratified by 
163 and Additional Protocol II by 159 states. Available at 
www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/party_gc/$File/Conventions%20de%20Geneve%20et%20
Protocoles%20additionnels%20ENG.pdf.       
97 This affects, for example, the internally displaced in Eritrea. For the status of ratification see (no. 
96). 
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of Additional Protocol II and be confined to the protection offered by common Article 
3. 
 
1.2. International Human Rights Law 
 
Ratification gaps also exist within the ambit of human rights law. Although some of 
the international treaties have attracted significant numbers of ratifications none of 
the instruments has reached a ratification status comparable with the almost 
universal one of the Geneva Conventions.98 Taking up the previously cited assertion 
that the fundamental principles of human rights form part of customary international 
law, the question arises to what extent customary law, which binds states regardless 
of whether they have ratified a treaty or not, may fill ratification gaps. In this respect, 
one must be aware that no general agreement exists on the identity of the exact 
rules that constitute customary law.99 However, there is a small core of rules that 
can be classified as custom beyond doubt, inter alia, the prohibition of torture and 
systematic racial discrimination.100 While these rules surely benefit the internally 
displaced they can hardly be considered sufficient to overcome the gap caused by 
non-ratification. 
 
1.3. International Criminal Law 
  
Currently, only 100 states have ratified the ICC Statute.101 Thus, it seems, its 
deterrent effect as regards the commission of crimes subject to the Court’s 
jurisdiction would apply merely to half of the states worldwide. However, in the case 
of international criminal law a tool can be used to overcome this protection gap. 
According to Article 13(b) the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the U.N. 
Charter can refer a situation in which crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court 
appears to have been committed to the prosecutor. In this very case the binding 
                                                 
98 For example, the ICCPR has been ratified by 152 states and is closely followed by the ICESCR 
which has been ratified by 149 states. Numbers are available at www.unhchr.ch/pdf/report.pdf.  
99 Brownlie (no. 75) 537, Meron (no. 65) 94-99, Oraá Human Rights in States of Emergency in 
International Law 214-216,  
100 Meron (no. 65) 94-95. 
101 Available at  www.iccnow.org/countryinfo/worldsigsandratifications.html. It should be noted, that the 
number of signatories already amounts to 139. 
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powers of the Security Council when acting under Chapter VII allow the Court to 
proceed even if the states concerned have not ratified the ICC Statute.102  
Before getting too optimistic about this possibility one must, however, bear in 
mind that political considerations are more than likely to bring the Security Council to 
decide against seizing the Court.103 Its discretionary power to determine whether 
Chapter VII actions are to be invoked gives it ample opportunity to refrain from 
approaching the Court, even if it appears that crimes within its jurisdiction have been 
committed.104  
 
As a result, the problem posed by ratification gaps is common to all three branches 
of international law identified as providing protection to IDPs. It deprives them of 
important legal safeguards that should be at their disposal. 
 
2. Claims as to the Inapplicability of Humanitarian Law 
 
The protection provided by humanitarian law, is not just hampered by ratification 
gaps. On the contrary, states faced with conflict often assert that the conflict in 
question is either different from the conflicts that are regulated by humanitarian law 
or has not reached the necessary intensity to render it applicable.105 Baxter summed 
it up well when he noted that “the first line of defense against international 
humanitarian law is to deny that it applies at all.”106  
What greatly facilitates this option of denial is the complexity of certain 
conflicts which may render it difficult to identify which category they belong.107 
Nowadays, such denial is particularly common, in regard to Additional Protocol II 
which, as pointed out previously, raises the threshold of the applicability of 
humanitarian law to an exceptionally high level and in this way becomes prone to 
claims of inapplicability.  
                                                 
102 Condorelli & Villalpando The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary 634. 
103 Condorelli & Villalpando (no. 102) 632. 
104 Condorelli & Villalpando (no. 102) 630-632 
105 Aldrich ’Human Rights and Armed Conflict: Conflicting Views’ (1973) 67 ASIL Proc. 141-142; 
Meron Human Rights in Internal Strife: Their International Protection 43-47. 
106 Baxter Some Existing Problems of Humanitarian Law in: The Concept of International Armed 
Conflict: Further Outlook 2. Cited in Meron (no. 105) 43. 
107 Meron (no. 105) 43-44. He names international armed conflict, internationalized-internal conflict, 
internal conflict of an armed character, internal strife accompanied by violence or internal tensions not 
accompanied by violence as examples for possible conflicts. Some of them may not, at all times, fit 
square within one of the concepts envisaged by international humanitarian law. 
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The response of the Russian authorities to the ongoing conflict in Chechnya, 
in which hundreds of thousands have been displaced, is only one example of 
this trend.108 Instead of acknowledging the fact that an internal armed conflict is 
raging in the region the Russian government is insisting that the current military 
activities are part of an anti-terror operation.109 In this respect, it is interesting to note 
that the Russian Constitutional Court has characterized the first Chechen conflict, 
which preceded the current one, as fulfilling the conditions required by Protocol II 
and furthermore contended that the Protocol was not duly respected.110 The conflicts 
hardly differ to an extent that would justify a new classification.  
Thus, even if ratified, the prospects for the application of humanitarian law, 
above all Additional Protocol II, are poor. Given the frequent and cruel nature of 
internal armed conflicts and the extent to which they generate internal displacement 
this is particularly deplorable.  
 
3. Derogation from Human Rights 
 
As in the case of humanitarian law, human rights instruments can be ineffective for 
other reasons than ratification gaps. Some of the major international and regional 
treaties contain derogation clauses which permit states to suspend certain rights 
during a state of emergency.111 This concept deserves closer consideration as it is 
precisely during emergencies when people are more prone to abuses and when the 
protection of human rights is needed most.  
 The question that first comes to mind is what circumstances can generate a 
state of emergency. To date, there exists no exhaustive list or definition for such 
circumstances. What can be observed is that there are a few grounds that typically 
provoke the declaration of a state of emergency and derogation from human rights 
                                                 
108 Whose responsibility? Protection of Chechen Internally Displaced Persons, Asylum Seekers and 
Refugees; Report by the Norwegian Refugee Council (May 2005) available at www.internal-
displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/8FB80DD0A132B095802570B70059FA5F/$f
ile/NRC+May+2005.pdf. Estimates of the number of the people displaced since 1999 (beginning of the 
second conflict) vary from 350.000 to 600.000.  
109 Whose Responsibility (no. 108) 11. See also: Chechnya and the Laws of War available at 
www.crimesofwar.org/expert/chechnya-print.html and www.hrw.org/press/2003/01/russia012903.htm.  
110 Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, Judgement on the Constitutionality of the 
Presidential Decrees and the Resolutions of the Federal Government Concerning the Situation in 
Chechnya (31 July 1995) available at www.icrc.org/ihl-
nat.nsf/0/ac8db8b32b8a2a5d432564dc0048bda4?OpenDocument .  
111 See Article 4 of the ICCPR, Article 15 of the ECHR and Article 27 of the ACHR.  
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standards, namely international and civil war, internal unrest, grave threats to the 
public order and subversion.112  
Needless to point out, many cases of internal displacement occur in the 
above mentioned situations. Therefore, the protection of IDPs is at stake when a 
government proclaims a state of emergency. This is even more so since experience 
has shown that governments, through pleas of emergency, frequently reject any 
criticism regarding their human rights record.113 It may, afterall, not be unthinkable 
that authorities would fabricate a crisis in order to justify the denial of rights.114
 Having said this, it must be remembered that even in time of emergency a 
state cannot derogate from all aspects of human rights protection.115 Each of the 
three conventions referred to provide for a number of rights that cannot be 
suspended. All of them stipulate that, inter alia, no derogation is possible from the 
right to life and the freedom from torture.116 Notably, in its latest General Comment 
on Article 4 of the ICCPR, the Human Rights Committee extended the list of non-
derogable rights from those expressly prescribed. To this end it gives some 
illustrative examples, one of which is crucial to the issue of internal displacement:  
 
‘As confirmed by the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court, deportation or forcible transfer of population without grounds 
permitted under international law, in the form of forced displacement 
by expulsion or other coercive means from the area in which the 
persons concerned are lawfully present, constitutes a crime against 
humanity. The legitimate right to derogate from Article 12 of the 
Covenant during a state of emergency can never be accepted as 
justifying such measures.’117
   
Bearing in mind that the General Comments of the Human Rights Committee 
serve, among others, the function to clarify, interpret and elaborate the provisions of 
the ICCPR, this is a significant improvement for IDPs.118  
To further curb the abuse of emergency powers certain requirements have 
been put forward to delineate situations that may properly be termed an emergency. 
                                                 
112 Oraá (no. 99) 30-33. 
113 Fitzpatrick ‘Protection Against the Abuse of the Concept of Emergency’ in Human Rights an 
Agenda for the Next Century 203. Meron (no. 105) 52. 
114 Fitzpatrick (no. 113) 203. 
115 Smith (no. 76) 174-175. 
116 Article 4(2) of the ICCPR, Article 15(2)of the ECHR, Article 27(2) of the ACHR. 
117 Human Rights Committee, General Comment 29, States of Emergency (Article 4 of the ICCPR) 
U.N. Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11 (2001) para. 13 (d). 
118 Steiner & Alston (no. 84) 732-737. 
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These include, for example, the existence of an exceptional threat of imminent 
character and the condition that the ordinary mechanisms of the state are 
overwhelmed, thus the continued stability of that community is fundamentally 
jeopardised.119  
Nonetheless, the state of emergency, being an ‘eminently indeterminate 
notion, lends itself easily to abuse by states anxious to provide a façade of legality 
for the perpetration of human rights abuses.’120 Therefore, it is likely that IDPs would 
suffer from diminished protection in a state of emergency.  
 
4. Minimum Humanitarian Standards – a Remedy for Protection Gaps? 
 
The two independent bodies of human rights and humanitarian law allow for their 
simultaneous application and one would assume that in conflict situations, regularly 
involving displacement, at least one of them is applicable. However, it may turn out 
that both systems are (at least close to) inapplicable. This would namely occur in 
situations where a state derogates from its human rights obligations without 
recognizing the applicability of humanitarian law.121 Needless to mention, the 
combined effect of such actions is highly detrimental concerning the protection of 
IDPs. 
 In an acknowledgment of this protection gap scholars have advocated that an 
irreducible core of rights must be formulated and recognized as applicable, at least, 
in the twilight zone between war and peace.122 Their efforts resulted in the 
Declaration of Minimum Humanitarian Standards which was submitted to the U.N. 
for further discussion.123 Article 1 (1) of the Declaration declares: 
 
                                                 
119 Provost (no. 58) 270-273. 
120 Provost (no. 58) 273. 
121 A recent example for such a situation is Nepal. In 2004, the Supreme Court of Nepal ruled that the 
Geneva Conventions are not applicable to the on-going conflict between the government and the 
Maoist rebels. Shortly after the ruling a state of emergency was declared. As a result IDPs in Nepal 
lack the protection of humanitarian and human rights law with the exception of a few non-derogable 
rights and rules of customary international law. See www.hrdc.net/sahrdc/hrfeatures/HRF98.htm 
(South Asia Human Rights Documentation Centre) and www.internal-
displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpCountries)/E545F30B5618B71D802570A7004BD25C?Op
enDocument.  
122 Meron ‘The Inadequate Reach of Humanitarian and Human Rights Law and the Need for a New 
Instrument’ (1983) 77 AJIL 603. 
123 Declaration of Minimum Humanitarian Standards in (1995) 89 AJIL 219-223. 
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‘This Declaration affirms minimum humanitarian standards which 
are applicable in all situations, including internal violence, ethnic, 
religious and national conflicts, disturbances, tensions and public 
emergency, and which cannot be derogated from under any 
circumstances. These standards must be respected whether or not 
a state of emergency has been proclaimed.’ 
 
The Declaration draws on fundamental rules of both humanitarian and human 
rights law.124 Among the rules of particular relevance for IDPs are the prohibition of 
violence aimed at spreading terror within the population and the guarantee of 
humanitarian assistance.125 The Declaration also prohibits displacement unless 
imperative security reasons demand such displacement.126 In that case the 
displaced shall be relocated under satisfactory conditions, they shall be free to move 
around in the area of relocation and families must be allowed to remain together.127 
As soon as the conditions that prompted their displacement have ceased, they must 
be allowed to return to their homes.128 In view of the nature of contemporary 
conflicts the Declaration, moreover, provides that: 
 
‘These standards shall be respected by and applied to all persons, 
groups and authorities irrespective of their legal status and without 
any adverse discrimination.’129
 
This provision seeks to overcome another major difficulty inherent in the 
system of human rights protection, namely that the norms designed to protect 
individuals are binding only upon states.130 Abuse of human rights stemming from 
the actions of non-state actors is not envisaged in this concept. However, such 
abuses occur all too frequently and contribute to the problem of internal 
displacement.131 Therefore, the extension of the binding force of fundamental human 
rights would be an additional benefit for IDPs. 
                                                 
124 Eide, Rosas & Meron ’Combating Lawlessness in Gray Zone Conflicts through Minimum 
Humanitarian Standards’ (1995) 89 AJIL 217. 
125 See Article 6 and Article 15 of the Declaration of Minimum Humanitarian Standards. 
126 See Article 7 of the Declaration of Minimum Humanitarian Standards. 
127 See Article 7 of the Declaration of Minimum Humanitarian Standards. 
128 See Article 7 of the Declaration of Minimum Humanitarian Standards. 
129 Article 2 of the Declaration of Minimum Humanitarian Standards. 
130 Eide, Rosas & Meron (no. 124) 216. 
131 The population of Sierra Leone, for example, suffered greatly from deliberate attacks of rebel 
forces. Typical actions of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) included forcing young boys into the 
ranks of the rebel forces, driving women and girls into sexual slavery and amputating arms at the wrist 
or elbow depending on whether the victim chose long or short sleeves. Such human rights abuses 
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Meaningful debate on the minimum standards at an international level began 
in 1996 when governments, scholars, U.N. agencies and NGOs met to discuss 
them.132 In the end, the participants requested an analytical report from the 
Secretary-General as regards the need for a U.N. document setting out and 
promoting minimum humanitarian standards.133 Even though the report concluded 
that a protection problem exists, it triggered no subsequent action apart from a 
request by the Human Rights Commission that the Secretary-General continue to 
study and consult on the matter.134
At this point, the question that needs to be answered is whether a set of 
minimum humanitarian standards is likely to be approved by the United Nations. As 
recent experience has shown that the environment in the U.N. is largely hostile to 
new standard-setting initiatives, skepticism toward that end is well founded.135 Thus, 
it seems unlikely that minimum humanitarian standards will be in place any time 
soon to remedy the effect of protection gaps on IDPs.  
 
5. The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement 
 
It emerges that despite the abundance of applicable norms, protection of IDPs can 
by no means be labelled complete. In response to the identified weaknesses of the 
law, the U.N. Representative on IDPs introduced the Guiding Principles on Internal 
Displacement in 1998.136 In contrast to the bodies of law discussed in part one they 
do not constitute treaty law. Instead, they are a soft law instrument and, therefore, 
not legally binding.137  
                                                                                                                                                        
have been one of the main causes of internal displacement in Sierra Leone. See Shawcross Deliver 
us from Evil: Warlords and Peacekeepers in a World of Endless Conflict 169-182. See also 
www.internal-displacement.org and http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/engAFR5102211998. Another 
example is Colombia, where over 30 percent of internal displacement have been attributed to violence 
stemming from non-state actors, namely the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and 
the National Liberation Army (ELN). See Obregon & Stavropoulou ‘In Search of Hope: The Plight of 
Displaced Colombians’ 410-413 in: Cohen & Deng (no. 4). 
132 Petrasek ’Moving Forward on the Development of Minimum Humanitarian Standards' (1998) 92 
AJIL 558-559. 
133 Petrasek (no. 132) 559 
134 CHR Res. 1998/29. 
135 Petrasek (no. 132) 562-563. 
136 Bagshaw ‘Internally Displaced Persons at the Fifty-Fourth Session of the United Nations 
Commission on Human Rights, 16 March – 24 April 1998’ (1998) 10 Int’l J. Ref. L. 548 – 549. 
137 The legal status of the Guiding Principles has generated some confusion. On the one hand, it is 
clearly a non-legally binding instrument to which state consent to be bound has never been expressed 
(see Article 11 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969) 9 ILM 679). On the other hand, 
they do not constitute typical soft law because they have not been negotiated by states or another 
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 At first this may seem surprising. There are, however, a number of sensible 
reasons why the Representative and his team of legal experts did not opt for a 
binding treaty. In light of the urgency of the situation they wanted to avoid prolonged 
negotiations associated with the drafting of a treaty.138 What made that decision 
easier was their conviction that the existing treaties already covered many aspects 
relevant to the protection of IDPs.139 A compilation and clarification of the rules, 
which at the time were scattered among numerous instruments, was what they 
believed to be necessary to effectively address the situtation of the internally 
displaced.140
 Moreover, they feared that an attempt to negotiate a treaty drawing upon 
existing law would provide states with the opportunity to put some of that law into 
question.141 To prevent the new document from becoming an opportunity to 
renegotiate old documents they refrained from pursuing the treaty option. Most 
importantly, even if a text could be adopted within a reasonable time, it would be 
prone to weaknesses, already discussed here in view of the other treaties, such as 
ratification gaps.142
 The Introduction to the Guiding Principles clarifies that they reflect, and are 
consistent, with international human rights law and international humanitarian law.143 
Notably, the Guiding Principles apply refugee law by analogy.144 This appears 
reasonable since the situation of refugees is, in many cases, very similar to the 
situation of IDPs. The Guiding Principles do, for example, prohibit forcible returns to 
places where the life and/or liberty of IDPs would be at risk.145 This provision 
strongly resembles the principle of non-refoulement contained in Article 33 of the 
1951 Refugee Convention.  
The Introduction also states that the purpose of the Principles is to provide 
guidance to, inter alia, states and other authorities or groups who face internal 
                                                                                                                                                        
international body. As a result they have also been termed “very soft” law. See Kälin ’How Hard is Soft 
Law? The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement and the Need for a Normative Framework’ 5-6 
available at www.brookings.edu/fp/projects/idp/articles/Kaelin12-19-01.pdf.  
138 Freedman (no. 10) 495. 
139 Mass Exoduses and Displaced Persons (no. 2) para.13. 
140 Mass Exoduses and Displaced Persons (no. 2) para.13. 
141 Kälin (no. 137) 2. 
142 Kälin (no. 137) 3. 
143 See Introduction to the Guiding Principles para. 3. 
144 Mass Exoduses and Displaced Persons (no. 2) para. 13. 
145 See Article 15(d) of the Guiding Principles. 
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displacement.146 Hence, their applicability is not limited to states. This is an 
important feature when striving for a complete protection of IDPs as they may be 
displaced to areas controlled by non-state actors who are not bound by human rights 
treaties. Another factor that contributes to a more complete protection is that the 
Guiding Principles address all phases of displacement, from protection against 
displacement and protection during displacement to issues crucial during the post-
displacement phase.147  
When first presented to the Commission on Human Rights in 1998, the 
Commission, instead of adopting the Principles, did nothing but take note of them.148 
However, recent responses have been more encouraging. The General Assembly, 
for example, has expressed its appreciation of the Guiding Principles, encouraged 
all relevant actors to make use of them when faced with internal displacement and 
welcomed the fact that an increasing number of states are applying them as 
standard.149  
The growth in acceptance of the Guiding Principles over the last years has 
indeed been remarkable. Supportive resolutions have been adopted by regional 
organisations and various states have adopted policies and/or laws based at least in 
part on the Guiding Principles while others consider following suit.150 Moreover, the 
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has used them to evaluate the 
treatment of IDPs by the Colombian authorities.151 Even non-state actors have been 
receptive of the Guiding Principles. The Sudan People’s Liberation Army, for 




Notwithstanding the progress made, numbers of the internally displaced have not 
declined and abuse and violations of their rights remain pervasive. While the Guiding 
                                                 
146 See Introduction to the Guiding Principles paras. 3(b)&(c). 
147 See Introduction to the Guiding Principles para. 1. 
148 CHR Res. 1998/50 para. 1. 
149 A/Res/56/164 paras 6 & 7. 
150 Among these countries are Angola, Burundi, Georgia and Uganda. See Schmidt ‘The Process and 
Prospects for the U.N. Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement to Become Customary 
International Law: A Preliminary Assessment’ (2004) 35 Geo. J. Int’l L. 493; Deng (no. 23) 25.  
151 See Inter-American Commission on Human Rights ‘Third Report on the Situation of Human Rights 
in Colombia’ (1999) Chapter VI available at www.cidh.oas.org/countryrep/Colom99en/chapter-6.htm.   
152 Schmidt (no. 150) 493; Deng (no. 23) 25. 
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Principles are important as they shift attention to a vulnerable group and compile 
and clarify protection mechanisms based on their needs, they do not have the 
potential to effectively tackle the examined protection gaps. 
In fact, no document whether legally binding or not, can, by itself, prevent a 
government determined to abuse its citizens from doing so. Many violations occur 
not because of protection gaps within the legal framework, but rather because of an 
unwillingness to comply with the existing rules. Therefore and above all, what has to 
be dealt with are gaps in the implementation of the law designed to protect IDPs  – 
something that can hardly be achieved by drafting more rules.  
As indicated earlier, international and regional monitoring bodies which were 
established to ensure the implementation of human rights law. Unfortunately, their 
means to do so are limited. The predominant system for overseeing a state’s 
perfomance in the arena of human rights is the reports system. Here, the monitoring 
bodies examine compliance on the basis of reports submitted by states and can, 
post examination, name those who fall short of their obligations and give 
recommendations as to what must be done to achieve compliance.153 Although the 
so-called ‘naming and shaming’ can be an effective tool to further the 
implementation of human rights standards, it will hardly be an overall solution to the 
crisis of internal displacement. Stronger enforcement mechanism will be needed 
because there are always states that do not respond to recommendations and polite 
requests. 
With respect to international humanitarian law the situation is even worse. 
Neither the Geneva Conventions nor Additional Protocol II contain any mechanism 
for enforcing the obligations contained in these instruments.154 To soothe the 
deplorable conditions in which IDPs live and to provide them with effective protection 
where states do not fulfill their obligations one must, thus, turn to different protection 





                                                 
153 Smith (no. 76) 146. 
154 Lewis (no. 27) 706. In how far the ICC can contribute to the implementation of humanitarian law by 
providing accountability for violations remains to be seen. 
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Chapter III  
 
Towards a More Effective Protection 
 
Ensuring that the internally displaced receive adequate assistance and protection in 
cases where their governments fail to provide it will, in reality, require a more active 
involvement on the part of the international community. Most likely such involvement 
will take in the form of intervention. This is exactly where the inherent tension 
between the concept of international protection and internal displacement surfaces. 
By putting up the banner of state sovereignty and invoking its corollary principles of 
territorial integrity and non-intervention, states commonly seek to prevent outside 
intervention in cases where internal displacement coincides with governments 
reluctance to live up to their international obligations.155  
The question that arises is whether resistance to implementation of 
international humanitarian and human rights standards by means of intervention can 
still be based on the notion of state sovereignty. If sovereignty truly means that a 
state has the unfettered right to treat individuals within its borders as it pleases, it 
would, in fact, pose an insuperable obstacle to any attempts to fill the protection 
vacuum for IDPs. The endeavour to provide effective protection to the internally 
displaced who lack assistance and protection from their own governments must start 
with an examination of the concept of sovereignty itself. 
 
1. The Concept of Sovereignty 
 
Sovereignty for a long time implied ‘independence all round’ and its indivisibility was 
fiercly defended over centuries.156 However, with regard to its place in the twentieth 
century, which was marked by the growth of international law, Oppenheim noted: 
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‘The question which is now confronting the science of law and 
politics is in how far sovereignty … is compatible with the normal 
functioning and development of international law and 
organisation.’157
 
In 1960, the International Court of Justice held the following, concerning the 
principle of state sovereignty: 
 
‘Sovereignty, as a basic concept of present international law, as a 
legal concept, is a bundle of competences conferred by 
international law. Any a priori or unlimited political concept of 
sovereignty must, with inescapable logic, lead to the non-existence 
of international law as law. Sovereignty is, therefore, essentially a 
relative notion; its content depends on the stage of development of 
international law.’158  
 
In other words, the principle of sovereignty exists within but not above the 
system of international law. As a result, by claiming sovereignty a state cannot 
exempt itself from obligations under treaties it consented to and customary 
international law. As regards the internally displaced, this implies that the 
international rules, identified in chapter two as affording them protection, are an 
appropriate subject for international concern. This finding is consistent with Article 55 
and Article 56 of the U.N. Charter, the constituent document of the United Nations 
which imposes upon the U.N. and its members the obligation to promote, respect and 
observe human rights and fundamental freedoms, thereby bringing the relationship of 
man and state under the umbrella of the United Nations.159
 However, the fact that international law is set up against an absolute concept 
of sovereignty does not mean that the concept has been entirely superseded. While 
affording protection to individuals, one must not lose sight of the fact that 
international law also contains rules that enshrine certain aspects of sovereignty. 
Again a look at the U.N. Charter is instructive. The relevant part of Article 2(7) reads: 
 
‘Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the 
United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within 
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the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members 
to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter.’ 
 
Clearly, Article 2(7) affirms the principle of non-intervention in the internal 
affairs of another state. It allows, however, for one exception, that is, an intervention 
which represents an enforcement action under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter.160 
Chapter VII empowers the Security Council to intervene in situations that pose a 
threat or constitute a breach of peace provided that the intervention is a suitable 
means to maintain or restore international peace and security.161  
Moreover, Article 2(4) prohibits the threat or use of force, inter alia, against 
the territorial integrity of states. It is unlikely that governments who deny their 
displaced citizens assistance and protection will yield to outsiders who try to remedy 
this situation. Therefore, outside intervention on behalf of the internally displaced will 
in all likelihood entail the use of force. The attempt to enforce humanitarian and 
human rights standards by means of force may conflict with Article 2(4). 
The ambiguity deriving from the aforementioned provisions leads to the 
question of whether the legitimate concern for the observance of humanitarian law 
and human rights can be lawfully expressed and remedied through outside 
intervention. The next section will examine a range of theories which have been 
advanced toward this end. 
 
2. Justifications of Intervention 
 
2.1. Forfeiture of Sovereignty   
 
One approach that seeks to make the two conflicting ends, respect for humanitarian 
and human rights standards and respect for sovereignty, meet, asserts that 
sovereignty ought to be regarded as conditional. A state’s failure to adhere to 
international standards and obligations will result in the loss of sovereignty.162 
Applied to the issue of internal displacement, it means that a state that is unwilling to 
ensure the rights of a displaced population forfeits its sovereignty. Thereafter, the 
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doors are open for the international community which can, without interfering with 
sovereignty, intervene in order to protect and assist IDPs.  
 The assertion that a state can forfeit its sovereignty is a novel and bold 
concept. States have numerous obligations under contemporary international law. If 
unwillingness to observe these obligations could result in a loss of sovereignty and 
justify international intervention, claims of a right to intervene could become 
dangerously common.163 In other words, the approach implies considerable potential 
for outside intervention. The prevailing reluctance to tamper with the concepts of 
sovereignty and non-intervention makes it unlikely that this approach will gain any 
significant support. Therefore, it seems it will be confined to the ambit of legal 
thinking and theory rather than practice. 
If, as Ruddick suggests, the concept of forfeiture of sovereignty were to be 
interpreted more conservatively, for example, as the temporary surrender of 
sovereignty for a particular purpose, it may some day attract more support.164 
However, as a legal basis for an intervention aimed at assisting and protecting the 
internally displaced the concept is, at present, of no practical relevance.  
 
2.2. Abuse of Rights 
 
The concept of abuse of rights exists in several systems of law and has also 
attracted backing from international tribunals.165 It holds that the exercise of a lawful 
right can become unlawful if it impedes the enjoyment of other rights.166 When 
applied to the present context it means that a state, which generally has the right to 
claim respect for its sovereignty, cannot do so if such a claim masks an arbitrary 
refusal to permit international assistance to the internally displaced.167 While the 
concept does not advocate a complete loss of sovereignty, it can still be used as the 
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basis for an argument in support of interventions aimed at protecting humanitarian 
and human rights standards.168
 To endorse this approach and to underline that sovereignty is not an 
immutable concept one scholar drew an analogy to classical property law: although 
a landowner has the absolute right to exclude trespass upon its property this right 
may be violated in cases of necessity, such as avoiding imminent disaster or serious 
harm to another person.169 Accordingly, intervention does not conflict with the 
concept of sovereignty where the latter is clearly exploited in bad faith. 
The concept of abuse of rights appears to have the potential to solve the 
question of how outside intervention to assist the internally displaced can be 
undertaken in a lawful manner. However, a closer look at the concept reveals that it 
has, so far, only been applied to administrative action and environmental law.170 That 
makes it difficult to invoke the concept as a precedent extending to situations where 
states refuse to assist and protect the internally displaced. Therefore, whether or not 
the concept of abuse of rights constitutes a general principle of international law must 
be examined. Only than may it be used more widely and applied to cases of internal 
displacement.  
Scholars have expressed conflicting opinions to this end. However, the 
majority tend to refuse the notion of abuse of rights recognition as an independent 
principle and rather perceive it as an application of other concepts such as, for 
example, good faith.171 Moreover, no international judicial decision has been 
explicitly founded on the concept of abuse of rights – which also counters its quality 
as a general rule of international law. In the Anglo-Iranian Oil Case, Judge Alvarez, a 
proponent of the concept, even acknowledged that it is still ‘finding its way into 
international law.’172  
In light of this, it would be unfounded to claim that the concept of abuse of 
rights applies to cases where a government fails to assist the internally displaced. 
Whether the concept will gain broader applicability in the future remains, at best, 
uncertain. Here, it is illustrative to read Brownlie’s view on the abuse of rights: 
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‘The doctrine is a useful agent in the progressive development of 
the law, but, as a general principle, it does not exist in positive law. 
Indeed, it is doubtful if it could be safely recognized as an 
ambulatory doctrine, since it would encourage doctrines as to the 
relativity of rights and results, outside the judicial forum, in 
instability.’173
 
 In addition to the problem of where exactly the concept of abuse of rights 
stands in international law, it holds just as much potential for abuse as the 
aforementioned concept of forfeiture of sovereignty. This further minimizes the 
likelihood that the concept can, one day, be used to aid IDPs. In conclusion, the 
concept of abuse of rights does not legitimize outside intervention aimed at providing 
assistance and protection to the internally displaced. 
 
2.3. Humanitarian Intervention 
 
Notwithstanding the shift from an absolute to a rather relative notion of sovereignty 
the question of on what basis intervention can be lawfully undertaken turns out to be 
difficult to answer. In seeking to solve the problem of how IDPs can be assisted, it is 
worth examining the concept of humanitarian intervention as it may provide a viable 
solution. Humanitarian intervention has traditionally been defined as one state’s:  
 
‘reliance upon force for the justifiable purpose of protecting the 
inhabitants of another state from treatment which is so arbitrary and 
persistently abusive as to exceed the limits of that authority within 
which the sovereign is presumed to act with reason and justice.’174   
 
As the traditional concept of sovereignty has changed, the understanding of 
humanitarian intervention has become broader. It is currently understood to include 
actions such as the delivery of humanitarian aid.175  
In contrast to the other approaches which have been advanced only recently, 
the concept of humanitarian intervention and its lawfulness have been debated for 
centuries. Different times have generated different answers to this question. 
Arguably, humanitarian intervention was believed to be lawful before the signing of 
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the U.N. Charter.176 This belief has changed and, more interestingly, may be 
changing again. The following sections will examine the concept’s place in recent 
history and the present before addressing where it may go in the future. 
 
2.3.1. Humanitarian Intervention and the U.N. Charter – Approach during the Cold 
War Era 
 
The U.N. Charter contains no explicit reference to humanitarian intervention. It is, 
however, widely perceived as fundamentally non-interventionist in its approach.177 
Article 2(4) is the most frequently cited provision to evidence that an intervention 
encompassing the use of force contravenes the U.N. Charter. Article 2(4) provides 
that: 
 
‘All members shall refrain in their international relations from the 
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any state, or any other matter inconsistent with the 
purposes of the United Nations.’ 
 
 Proponents of humanitarian intervention have asserted that an intervention on 
strictly humanitarian grounds is neither aimed at the ‘territorial integrity’ nor the 
‘political independence’ of the target state, and thus is not in conflict with Article 
2(4).178 However, in light of the travaux préparatoires this reading of Article 2(4) 
cannot be upheld. The two alternatives were introduced at the request of several 
smaller states that wanted to emphasize ‘territorial integrity’ and ‘political 
independence’ but had no intention of restricting the general scope of Article 2(4).179
 Another argument that attempts to reconcile the concept of humanitarian 
intervention with Article 2(4) stresses that such interventions are undertaken in 
adherence to other Charter provisions.180 Article 1(3), for example, stipulates that 
the achievement of international co-operation in promoting and encouraging respect 
for human rights is one purpose of the United Nations. As Article 2(4) only prohibits 
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the threat or use of force inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations, it is 
maintained that it cannot be illegal if triggered by gross human rights violations. This, 
however, has been countered by the argument that the non-use of force is the 
predominant principle.181 Henkin summed it up well: 
 
‘Article 2(4) is the most important norm of international law, the 
distillation and embodiment of the primary value of the inter-state 
system, the defence of state independence and state autonomy. 
The Charter contemplated no exceptions. It prohibits the use of 
force for selfish state interests as well as for benign purposes, 
human values. It declares peace as the supreme value, to secure 
not merely state autonomy, but fundamental order for all. It declares 
peace to be more compelling than inter-state justice, more 
compelling even than human rights or other human values.’182
 
  Therefore, even in the case of conflicting values, Article 2(4) cannot be put in 
jeopardy.  
Under the provisions of the U.N. Charter it was only Chapter VII that left some 
room to permit interventions on humanitarian grounds. It is Article 39 that entitles the 
Security Council to take action when it deems a certain situation to be a threat to, or 
a breach of, the peace. According to Article 42 this action may include the use of 
force. Moreover, as has been indicated before, Article 2(7) recognizes the possibility 
that the Security Council can authorize these measures within a sovereign state.  
The question of whether a humanitarian crisis, as the crisis of internal 
displacement, can constitute, at minimum, a threat to peace, thus, enabling the 
Security Council to authorize an intervention does not need to be answered in the 
Cold War context. Obtaining Security Council authorization for carrying out a 
humanitarian intervention was, in practice, due to the prevailing climate of mistrust, 
not a viable option.183 The great powers would have impeded interventions by using 
their veto power. 
To circumvent the problems posed by the U.N. Charter, some scholars 
contended that humanitarian interventions were lawful under customary international 
law.184 However, this position has been widely rejected because the necessary 
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conditions to establish a rule of customary international law were lacking. Custom is 
created by state practice and opinio iuris.185  Although one could cite a handful of 
possible precedents to support the requirement of state practice, for example, the 
interventions by India in East Pakistan (1971), Vietnam in Cambodia (1978) and 
Tanzania in Uganda (1979) one would not be able to establish opinio iuris in its 
support. While the intervening states could have argued that they got involved for 
humanitarian reasons they rather claimed that they had acted in self-defense.186 In 
addition to the absence of opinio iuris on the part of the acting powers, the actions 
were opposed as unlawful by, at least, parts of the international community. It is, 
therefore, impossible to claim that humanitarian interventions were permitted under 
customary international law. 
 In conclusion, none of the arguments that the concept of humanitarian 
intervention is compatible with Article 2(4) was considered to be convincing. As a 
result, the prevailing view considered humanitarian intervention illegal, unless 
undertaken in the (unlikely) event of Security Council authorization.  
 
2.3.2. Humanitarian Intervention and the UN Charter – Post Cold War Approach 
 
The end of the Cold War stalemate and subsequent events led to a revival of the 
debate on humanitarian intervention. Several cases strikingly demonstrated the 
urgent need for outside help in cases where people are threatened or not assisted 
by their own government.187 In fact, over the past 15 years a number of interventions 
under humanitarian auspices have occurred.188 State practice has developed at 
great speed and even given way to the claim that there is an emerging right of 
humanitarian intervention without Security Council permission.189 Some of these 
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interventions will be briefly examined to demonstrate how recent developments have 
influenced the debate on the lawfulness of humanitarian intervention.  
Somalia 
 
In 1991, after being in power for two decades, the government of Mohammed Siad 
Barre was overthrown and Somalia plunged into a clan-based civil war, as a result 
central authority collapsed entirely.190 The effects of the civil war were exacerbated 
by a famine, largely caused by the warring factions who employed the destruction of 
farmland and looting of food stocks as means of warfare.191 These conditions led to 
large-scale displacement and many of those uprooted lived on the verge of 
starvation.192 The humanitarian crisis which unfolded soon captured the world’s 
attention.  
 In December 1992 the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 794. 
After recognizing the unique character of the situation, it determined 
 
‘that the magnitude of the human tragedy caused by the conflict  
in Somalia, further exacerbated by the obstacles being created to 
the distribution of humanitarian assistance, constitutes a threat to 
international peace and security.’193
 
 This finding gave the Security Council authority to decide what measures had 
to be taken to maintain or restore international peace and security.194 Acting under 
Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter it then authorized  
 
‘the Secretary-General and member states … to use all necessary 
means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for 
humanitarian relief operations in Somalia.’195
 
 Thereafter, U.S. President George Bush ordered 28,000 troops into Somalia 
to ensure the safe delivery of international aid.196  
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At first sight the intervention in Somalia, undertaken with the authorization of 
the Security Council, may not seem to contribute to a progressive development of 
humanitarian intervention. After all, interventions authorized by the Security Council 
have always been lawful. The intervention in Somalia is, however, significant for two 
reasons. First, it clarified that an internal humanitarian crisis can qualify as a threat 
to international peace and security. As pointed out in the previous section such a 
finding would have hardly been possible in the climate of mistrust that prevailed 
during the Cold War. Moreover and for the first time in its history, the Security 
Council used its powers under Chapter VII to sanction an intervention aimed at the 
delivery of humanitarian aid.197 Thus, by adopting Resolution 794 the Security 
Council broke new ground concerning the concept of humanitarian intervention.  
However, its value as a progressive approach to humanitarian intervention, 
namely one that would benefit IDPs, is limited. By emphasizing the exceptional 
character of the situation in Somalia the Security Council implied that it did not want 
its actions to form a precedent for future situations. Furthermore, it is important to 
note that the intervention in Somalia did not threaten the rights and privileges 
associated with state sovereignty because state authority in Somalia had practically 
collapsed.198 Presumably, this made it easier for the community of states to take 
what were bold steps in view of the traditional approach to intervention. 
Nonetheless, the case of Somalia is significant as it indicates the departure from the 




Sierra Leone has been in a state of civil war since 1991 when the Revolutionary 
United Front (RUF), led by the former Sierra Leonean army corporal Foday Sankoh, 
invaded the country from neighbouring Liberia.199 In 1992, shortly after the invasion, 
the military ousted the government of Joseph Momoh and took up the battle against 
the rebel forces.200 The military rule lasted for four years. In 1996, Ahmed Kabbah 
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was elected president.201 His government, however, only remained in power until 
1997, when it was overthrown by the Armed Forces Revolutionary Committee 
(AFRC).202 The instability led to further RUF rampages and a massive humanitarian 
crisis was under way which eventually left more than half of the country’s population 
displaced.203
 In response to the deplorable conditions in Sierra Leone, the Security Council, 
in October 1997, unanimously adopted Resolution 1132. It stated that the Council 
was: 
 
‘gravely concerned at the continued violence and loss of life in 
Sierra Leone following the military coup of May 25, 1997, the 
deteriorating humanitarian conditions in that country and the 
consequences for neighbouring countries.’204
 
 The Security Council then deemed the situation a threat to international peace 
and security.205 In acknowledging transboundary effects of the situation, the 
invocation of Article 39 was less exceptional than in the case of Somalia. However, 
humanitarian considerations were in the forefront, when the situation in Sierra Leone 
was designated a threat to international peace and security.206 To maintain 
international peace and security, an arms embargo was imposed to cut off foreign 
supplies to the warring factions.207 The resolution then expressly authorized the 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to ensure the strict 
implementation of the embargo.208
 Here one peculiarity of the situation in Sierra Leone surfaces. ECOWAS was 
already engaged in the country prior to obtaining U.N. authorization. It had acted in 
advance of its Council mandate which, in light of Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter was 
prima facie illegal.209 However, the international community did not condemn the 
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intervention but instead gave it, through Resolution 1132, post facto sanctioning. 
Moreover, the Secretary-General commended ECOWAS’ intervention as ‘laudable’ 
and urged other states to contribute to its efforts.210 This deserves further 
examination as it may lead to a broader concept of permissible humanitarian 
interventions. 
 The fact that the Security Council was willing to endorse the ECOWAS activity 
implies that the international community came to accept humanitarian intervention by 
regional actors, even if initially undertaken without its authorization. However, when 
considering the specific features that make up the situation in Sierra Leone, this 
assumption may be inaccurate. Similar to Somalia, Sierra Leone at the time of the 
intervention had no functioning central government. Its legal ruling authority had lost 
the support of its own military in the protracted civil war against the RUF.211 
Eventually it was ousted and, as a result, lost complete control over the events 
occurring in the country.  
Thus, a strong argument can be made that it was, again, the lack of state 
authority that spurred the support for the intervention.212 States did not have to fear 
an erosion of the concept of sovereignty by approving the intervention. It is rather 
difficult, to see their approval in isolation from its perceived effects on the concept of 
sovereignty. The value of the ECOWAS intervention for a broader concept of lawful 
interventions is, thus, limited to the context of collapsed state authority accompanied 
by gross violations of humanitarian and human rights standards. In this respect, it 
reinforces that humanitarian catastrophes within a state can give rise to outside 
intervention. 
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Ethnic tensions in Yugoslavia had long been suppressed but with the end of the 
Cold War, problems that had been simmering boiled over into war, when Slovenia, 
Bosnia and Croatia sought their independence from Yugoslavia.213 Kosovo, in 
contrast to Slovenia, Bosnia and Crotia not a republic of the Yugoslav Federation but 
a province of Serbia, also wanted independence.214 Although the region was 
experiencing unrest, no war broke out which is probably why, in 1995, when the 
Dayton Peace Accords were signed to end the war, no mention was made of 
Kosovo, though it was widely acknowledged to be one of the most sensitive areas in 
the Balkans.215
 In the late 1990s, the conflict between Serbs and Kosovars escalated into an 
armed conflict between Serb forces and the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). More 
than 200.000 Kosovars fled their villages to escape indiscriminate Serb attacks.216 
With the fighting and its humanitarian consequences increasing, the Security 
Council, in 1998, adopted Resolution 1199. It declared the conflict in the Kosovo a 
threat to regional peace and security, thus, stopped short of invoking Article 39 of 
the U.N. Charter.217  
The Security Council did, however, demand action to improve the 
humanitarian situation. It, inter alia, required the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
(FRY) to facilitate the return of displaced persons and to allow free and unimpeded 
access for humanitarian organizations and supplies.218 At the conclusion of the 
resolution, it also decided ‘to consider further action and additional measures to 
maintain and restore peace in the region’ if the measures demanded in this 
resolution were not be taken.219  
Assuming that the Security Council would not take more decisive measures 
because Russia or China (or both) would veto any resolution that supported military 
intervention, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) intervened without 
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Security Council authorization.220 When NATO acted, the Security Council met in an 
emergency session, where China and Russia, indeed, opposed the intervention as a 
violation of international law.221 Notably, some of the states taking part in the 
intervention justified it on the basis of the concept of humanitarian intervention. The 
UK delegate stated: 
 
The action being taken is legal. It is justified as an exceptional 
measure to prevent an overwhelming humanitarian catastrophe. 
Under present circumstances in Kosovo, there is convincing 
evidence that such a catastrophe is imminent. Renewed acts of 
repression by the authorities of the FRY would cause further loss of 
civilian life and would lead to displacement of the civilian population 
on a large scale and in hostile conditions.  
Every means short of force has been tried to avert this 
situation. In these circumstances, and as an exceptional measure 
on grounds of overwhelming humanitarian necessity, military 
intervention is legally justifiable. The force now proposed is directed 
exclusively to averting a humanitarian catastrophe and is the 
minimum judged necessary for that purpose.222
 
No official condemnation of the intervention followed and supporters of the 
action claimed it as a new precedent for humanitarian intervention.223 However, in 
light of the U.N. Charter the intervention usurped the authority of the Security 
Council and violated Article 2(4). In contrast to the situation in Sierral Leone, no 
explicit post facto authorization was granted. Although the Secretary-General stated 
that ‘there are times when the use of force may be legitimate in the pursuit of peace’ 
he emphasized that the Security Council should be involved in any decision 
pertaining to the use of force.224
 As there is no legal basis for the NATO intervention in the Charter, one can 
only argue that interventions, such as NATO’s are nowadays justified under 
customary international law. The Kosovo intervention may be evidence of state 
practice and opinio iuris. However, more state practice and opinio iuris will be 
needed before interventions in functioning states without the authorization of the 
Security Council can be considered a new rule and thus an exception to the corollary 
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principles of sovereignty, in particular the prohibition of use of force against the 
territorial integrity and political independence of a state.225
 
2.3.3. Future Trends 
 
While the NATO intervention was unlawful it has, nonetheless, been characterized 
as an emerging rule of international law, consistent with contemporary trends on the 
international plane.226 Among these trends the following were identified: first, human 
rights are increasingly perceived to be of concern to the world community and 
second, large-scale abuses may prompt a form of state responsibility different than 
that of delictual responsibility, to which international organizations or groups of 
states have to respond in a more decisive fashion.227 The latter trend is clearly 
evidenced by the growing number of interventions through international 
organizations, in domestic conflicts where human rights are at stake.228
 Based on these trends, Cassese has submitted that: 
 
‘under certain strict conditions resort to armed force may gradually 
become justified, even absent any authorization by the Security 
Council.’229
 
An established set of criteria is crucial to prevent a broader concept of 
humanitarian intervention from being employed for abusive purposes.230 With regard 
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to the crisis of internal displacement, the day when a broader concept of 




Over the last few years, the Security Council has expanded its criteria for occasions 
justifying intervention. It is now willing to characterize serious violations of 
humanitarian and human rights law in the wake of internal conflicts, almost inevitably 
accompanied by mass displacement, as threats to international peace and security. 
It has, in fact, declared that the following scenarios may fall under Article 39 of the 
U.N. Charter: the deliberate denial of humanitarian access to civilians and situations 
where IDPs are under the threat of harassment or where their camps are at risk of 
infiltration by armed elements.231  
Hence, situations of internal displacement can today give rise to humanitarian 
interventions under Chapter VII. Experience has shown that this is most likely to 
happen in cases where states have lost their governing authority since in such cases 
an encroachment on the concept of sovereignty is not evident. However, 
humanitarian interventions under Chapter VII can be undertaken on a broader basis. 
In the end, it will depend on the will of states as to whether humanitarian 
interventions authorized by the Security Council will become an effective tool to 
alleviate the suffering of the internally displaced, not just in cases where a state is 
unable but also in cases where a state is unwilling to assist and protect IDPs.  
Moreover, humanitarian interventions carried out by regional organizations or 
groups of states have been legitimized, even in the absence of prior approval by the 
Security Council, in cases where state authority has collapsed and humanitarian 
catastrophes persist.232 In addition to Sierra Leone, Liberia provides a similar 
example for this phenomenon.233 Nonetheless, acting in such circumstance is still 
subject to certain precariousness as it is possible that future interventions of that 
kind will not gain post facto authorization. 
Beyond the aforementioned instances, it is much more difficult to assert that 
humanitarian interventions can be considered legal. The U.N. Charter does not allow 
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interventions other than those authorized by the Security Council and evidence for 
their legality under customary international law remains weak. Bearing in mind how 
easily such a rule could be used to disguise abusive interventions it is unlikely that it 
will emerge any time soon. Nonetheless, the concept could become commandingly 
persuasive with the advent of future interventions.  
Thus far, humanitarian interventions in functioning states aimed at assisting 
and protecting the internally displaced cannot be undertaken in a legal manner, 
without having the authorization of the Security Council. On one hand, this can be 
welcomed because the Council’s authorization affords the strongest safeguard 
against abusive interventions, shielded as humanitarian, that the contemporary 
system provides. On the other hand it makes it harder to alleviate the plight of the 
internally displaced as obtaining authorization can prove to be a difficult endeavour. 
As mentioned earlier, the effectiveness of humanitarian interventions authorized by 
the Security Council, aimed to assist the internally displaced, will now be dependent 
upon the will of states. 
The recent trends and their significance for the plight of the internally 
displaced are captured well by Dacyl: 
 
‘The post Cold War responses to internally displaced persons … 
seem to denote increased international concern to safeguard their 
human rights and simultaneous – albeit not necessarily intentional – 
questioning of the sanctity of the sovereignty principle with regard 
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Internal Displacement in the Sudan – A Case Study 
 
Few, if any, countries have suffered greater internal displacement than the Sudan. 
At present, more than five million people in the Sudan are uprooted from their homes 
but never crossed the border into another country. In outlining the history of the 
conflict the case study will exemplify typical causes of displacement. It will provide 
insight into the circumstances in which displaced populations live, thereby 
demonstrating some of their most urgent needs. After exploring how international 
law protects them, it will address what has been done to ensure that the Sudan’s 
internally displaced receive adequate protection. The issues that have been dealt 
with in the previous chapters will resurface in the context of this particular case.  
 
1. Causes of Displacement 
 
Like many other conflicts that generate displacement, the conflict in Sudan can be 
depicted as: regional, religious, racial, ethnic and cultural.235 About 70 percent of the 
population is Muslim, 25 percent Animist and 5 percent. Christian.236 While Muslims 
live predominantly in the more populous north, Christians and Animists live in the 
south.237 In addition to religion, language and culture divide the country. People in 
the north speak Arabic and their culture is based on the Islamic faith whereas people 
in the south speak English and African languages and adhere to Christian or 
traditional African cultures.238 Furthermore, the Sudan is divided when it comes to 
political influence and economic power. Political power was given to the northern 
elite even before the country gained independence, in 1956.239 The north has, 
thereafter, continued to dominate the political and economic life of the Sudan.240
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In light of these divisions, it comes to no surprise that frustration with northern 
domination, suppression and exploitation led to the first civil war which ended with 
the signing of the Addis Ababa Agreement, in 1972.241  First and foremost, the 
agreement granted regional autonomy to the south.242 Moreover, it recognized 
English instead of Arabic as the main language of the south and provided that the 
southern Sudanese insurgents (Anya Nya) be absorbed into the army and serve in 
the south.243 However, the government consistently undermined the agreement and 
as a consequence peace lasted no longer than a decade.244  
 
1.1. Conflict and Displacement during the 1980s 
 
In 1983, the Arab-led government broke up the south, transforming it from one into 
three separate administrative regions.245 Although each region had its own 
governing body they were deprived of most of the autonomy they had gained 
through the Addis Ababa Agreement.246 Moreover, Arabic was, again, declared to be 
the only official language of the country and Shari’a (Islamic) law was introduced as 
the sole source of law.247  
When the government learned of the planned uprising of southern officers it 
ordered the officers involved, together with their forces, from their bases in the south 
to others in the north.248 One battalion, led by John Garang, resisted the orders to be 
rotated to the north and instead broke with Khartoum and left for the Ethiopian 
border, where it was subsequently joined by members of other battalions.249 Thus, 
the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) was born and the second civil war 
unfolded. 
 As the SPLA gained strength (by 1986 it was estimated to have the support of 
12.500 men) it shifted its activities from rural areas to attacking government garrison 
towns in the south.250 At the same time, the government started to supply automatic 
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weapons and other military supplies to Arab raiders, as part of its general campaign 
against the south.251 The raiders, already responsible for killings, rape, arson and 
theft of cattle used the increased firepower to depopulate hundreds of African 
villages.252  
Due to these developments internal displacement abounded, the government, 
however, remained inactive. Not so the SPLA. In 1986 the SPLA’s nascent 
humanitarian arm, the Sudanese Relief and Rehabilitation Association (SRRA), was 
providing food to about 20.000 internally displaced.253 When the SPLA asked the 
United Nations to help assist IDPs it was strongly supported by the head of the 
Office of U.N. Emergency Operations in the Sudan who was in return declared a 
persona non grata by the Sudanese government. While displacement continued 
international aid did not materialise. 
 By the late 1980s, the SPLA’s military capacity had grown significantly. Its 
man-power was estimated at 20.000 to 30.000 and its activities threatened major 
district and provincial capitals.254 At this point, the character of the conflict changed 
from local to countrywide. Ongoing peace efforts were squashed when, in 1989, a 
military coup ousted the government and brought the National Islamic Front (NIF) to 
power which promptly proclaimed a holy war against the non-Muslim south.255 Thus, 
the stage was set for the conflict to enter the 1990s. 
 
1.2. Conflict and Displacement during the 1990s until today 
 
By 1991, the SPLA’s strength had reached 50.000 to 60.000 men and it controlled 
large parts of the south.256 As a result, many displaced persons were able to return 
to their homes.257 However, in 1991, international and internal events weakened the 
SPLA. The fall of the Mengistu regime in Ethiopia deprived the SPLA of military 
support and transit possibilities.258 Furthermore, a power struggle within the 
leadership of the SPLA escalated and led to the split of the group.259 In the following 
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years, more southerners died at the hands of the fighting factions than at the hands 
of the Sudanese military, although the government had started a massive campaign 
aimed at regaining the lost territory.260 Because of its weakness, the SPLA returned 
to the guerilla tactics of its early days which only added to the factors that once 
again prompted tens of thousands of southerners to flee their homes.261  
By the later half of the 1990s, the number of IDPs in the Sudan had risen to 
four million.262 For years to come, negotiations between the government and SPLA 
made little or no progress, it was only in January 2005, after a decade of on and off 
negotiations that a peace agreement was signed.263 At that time the number of IDPs 
had mushroomed to over five million, largely due to the crisis in Darfur, the western 
region of the country, where in 2003 conflict between rebels and the government 
erupted.264  
The Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and the Justice and Equality Movement 
(JEM), mainly made up of African tribes, started to fight the government on grounds 
of economic, political and social marginalization of the Darfur region.265 The 
government, which still had many of its forces located in the south, reacted by 
arming Arab militia to eradicate alleged rebel support bases among the African 
tribes.266 Subsequently, a campaign of killing, rape and pillage ensued. A 
humanitarian ceasefire agreement and multiple other agreements were negotiated, 
signed and then violated.267 Peace talks have gone into the sixth round but as of 
today, daily life is characterized by violence, lawlessness and human suffering.268 It 
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2. Conditions of Displacement 
 
Sudan’s over five million internally displaced live under dreadful conditions.269 They 
suffer from forced removals at the hands of the government.270 They are 
continuously harassed by both government and rebel forces and live under the 
persistent threat of abductions, rapes and killings.271 Furthermore, their poor living 
conditions in or outside of camps render them prone to malnutrition and diseases.272  
The following section will take a closer look at two specific situations currently 
harming Sudan’s internally displaced and examine each of them in light of the 
protection mechanisms discussed in chapter two.  
Of the instruments discussed in chapter two the Sudan is a party to the four 
Geneva Conventions but has neither signed nor ratified the Additional Protocols.273 
As the situation in the Sudan constitutes an internal armed conflict, only common 
Article 3 will be considered here. The Sudan is also bound by the ICCPR, ICESCR 
and CERD.274 On the regional level the Sudan is bound by the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights.275 Furthermore the Sudan has signed the ICC Statute, 
in 2000. However, as to date, it has not been ratified.276  
 
2.1. Forced Removals 
 
Account of the Situation 
 
Shortly after gaining power, the NIF government announced that all displaced 
southerners would be removed from areas in and around Sudan’s capital city, 
Khartoum.277 The purpose of this policy was to effectively cleanse the city of 
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undesirable non-Muslim elements.278 In 1992, Human Rights Watch reported on the 
impact of this policy: 
 
‘the military government of Sudan has in recent months bulldozed 
and burned the homes of about 500,000 of its poorest citizens in a 
forcible and often violent program of expulsions from Khartoum to 
new camps located outside the city.’279  
 
 After five years of continuous removals which displaced the already displaced 
for a second time, Human Rights Watch observed that the conditions of the 
relocation sites  
 
‘were significantly harsher than in the demolished shantytowns, the 
government has literally bulldozed its way to its goal, which appears 
to be cleansing Khartoum of undesirable poverty-stricken migrants 
who arrived because … of war from their rural places of origin.280
 
Despite these actions, IDPs kept fleeing north to move beyond the war zones, 
in particular to Khartoum.281 As a result, the destruction of homes in and around 
Khartoum and the subsequent removal of IDPs to isolated areas continues to be a 
reality.282 In fact, 250,000 displaced persons have been affected since the end of 
2003.283
  
Assessment under International Law 
 
The only applicable provision of humanitarian law, common Article 3, makes no 
reference to the forced relocation of civilians.284 However, human rights instruments 
enshrine the freedom of movement and residence in Article 13(1) of the UDHR, 
Article 12 (1) of the ICCPR and Article 12(1) of the African Charter. As human rights 
apply to all individuals without distinction, internally displaced persons are entitled to 
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the enjoyment of the right to freely choose their place of residence. The freedom of 
residence means that anyone can set up a temporary or permanent residence.285 
Although the articles do not explicitly refer to protection against forced removals they 
are broad enough to encompass such protection.  
 However, the freedom of movement and residence is subject to 
restrictions.286 If the government had carried out the removals in accordance with 
the requirements set out in the restriction clause the removals would be justified. 
According to the requirements, restrictions must be provided by law.287 They must 
also be necessary for protecting values such as national security or public order.288 
Finally, the restrictions must be consistent with other rights.289 The Sudanese 
government’s actions do not fulfill these criteria. Most obvious, they are not aimed at 
protecting public values but at furthering the government’s discriminatory policies 
against southerners. Failing justification under the restriction clause, the 
government’s actions constitute a breach of its obligation under the aformentioned 
provisions. 
Furthermore, Article 11(1) of the ICESCR recognizes ‘the right of everyone to 
an adequate standard of living for himself and his family, including … housing.’ It 
stipulates that state parties are required to take appropriate steps to ensure the 
realization of this right.290 Forced removals can hardly be considered an appropriate 
step to ensure the right to housing. Notably, the Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights stated in its General Comment on Article 11(1) that ‘instances of 
forced eviction are prima facie incompatible with the requirements of the 
Covenant.’291 Thus, the forced removals also contravene the government’s 
obligation under Article 11(1) of the ICESCR.  
Finally, Article 5(d)(i) of the CERD provides that the exercise of the freedom 
of movement and residence ought to be enjoyed without discrimination. In light of 
the fact that the government’s policies clearly discriminate against southerners by 
not allowing them to settle in Khartoum, it also breaches this provision.  
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In conclusion, human rights law protects IDPs against forced removals. The 
Sudanese government, by forcibly relocating IDPs from the south, clearly violates its 
obligations under human rights law.  
 
2.2. Personal Security 
 
Account of the Situation 
 
With the signing of the peace-agreement the active conflict between the government 
and the SPLA ceased. However, hostilities are still raging in Darfur and the personal 
safety of the region’s internally displaced remains at risk.292 Their camps have been 
the targets of systematic attacks.293 Rape and other forms of sexual abuse occur all 
too frequently.294 Victims of sexual violence are regularly insulted and humiliated, 
beaten and in some cases even killed.295 Abuse of women and girls is facilitated by 
the fact that it is mainly women and girls who leave the camps to collect firewood 
since they have a better chance to survive attacks than men and boys who risk 
being killed.296 In the majority of cases, perpetrators belong either to government 
forces or pro-government militia.297
The government has claimed that police are deployed around the camps to 
protect IDPs.298 However, police forces have not confronted the militias which often 
stay around camps to prevent people from returning to their villages.299 As a result, 
anyone leaving the camp is a potential target for the militias. In addition, it has been 
reported that policemen assigned to protect IDP camps leave their posts towards the 
evening, thus, facilitating militia assaults over night.300 Finally, police forces have 
reportedly shot into the camps allegedly responding to rebels attacking, but in reality 
killing IDPs.301  
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Assessment under International Law 
 
Article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions proscribes that the parties to an 
internal armed conflict treat anyone who is not taking an active part in hostilities 
humanely without any adverse distinction.302 It expressly prohibits acts of violence to 
the life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, cruel treatment and torture as 
well as outrages upon human dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading 
treatment.303 Accordingly, humanitarian law protects IDPs against the acts frequently 
imposed upon them, as long as they are not participants in the conflict.  
In an attempt to justify why it targets the camps, the Sudanese government 
has asserted that rebels use IDP camps as bases from which to launch their 
attacks.304 However even if this allegation proves to be true, IDPs would still be 
entitled to protection under common Article 3 as they are not active participants in 
the conflict. 
The physical security of IDPs is also protected by human rights law. First and 
foremost, the right to life is affirmed in Article 3 of the UDHR, Article 6(1) of the 
ICCPR and Article 4 of the African Charter. The ICCPR and the African Charter 
furthermore elaborate that arbitrary deprivations of the right to life are never 
allowed.305 In this respect the Human Rights Committee noted that:  
 
‘the protection against arbitrary deprivation of life which is explicitly 
required by the third sentence of article 6 (1) is of paramount 
importance. The Committee considers that States parties should 
take measures not only to prevent and punish deprivation of life by 
criminal acts, but also to prevent arbitrary killing by their own 
security forces. The deprivation of life by the authorities of the State 
is a matter of the utmost gravity.’306  
 
 The fundamental importance of the right to life is underlined by the fact that 
Article 4(2) of the ICCPR renders it underogable. Thus, even in times of 
emergencies threatening the life of a nation, governments are obliged to respect the 
right to life. The death of IDPs at the hands of the Sudanese armed forces and 
police clearly constitutes a violation of this right. 
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Notably, Article 4 of the African Convention by providing that ‘human beings 
are inviolable’ and that ‘every human being shall be entitled to respect for his life and 
the integrity of his person’ provides a more general protection than the other 
provisions. For example, encompassing protection against rape and beatings, as 
such acts clearly disrespect an individual’s integrity.   
However, Article 5 of the UDHR, Article 7 of the ICCPR fill this gap as they 
expressly prohibit other forms of violence by prohibiting torture and cruel, inhuman 
or degrading treatment.307 Article 7 of the ICCPR is, as the right to life, an 
underogable right.308 In interpreting Article 7, the Human Rights Committee has 
emphasized that it ‘relates not only to acts that cause physical pain but also to acts 
that cause mental suffering.’309 The reference to both, physical and mental pain 
accommodates a wide range of practices, including sexual violence and the threat 
thereof.  
In conclusion, the Sudan is bound by several norms of international law that 
protect the personal safety of IDPs. According to the account given, the Sudanese 
government has not guaranteed but instead violated these provisions. 
 
The last section affirms the findings made in chapter two. On the one hand, it proves 
that humanitarian and human rights law obliges states to protect and assist IDPs. on 
the other hand, it exemplifies one of the shortcomings of the international protection 
system which were discussed in chapter two. The fact that the Sudan has not ratified 
the Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions renders the detailed provisions 
of Additional Protocol II inapplicable. As a result, the Protocol’s safeguards can, at 
best, be inferred from applicable provisions. 
Most importantly, the section demonstrates that the rights of IDPs are 
consistently violated. This finding is in accordance with the conclusion of chapter two 
which asserts that the unwillingness to comply with rules constitutes the main 
obstacle to the protection of IDPs. The Sudan, in fact, provides a text book example 
of how much IDPs suffer at the hands of their own government. Lacking the support 
and protection from their own government, Sudanese IDPs are left with nothing but 
the international community to turn to.  
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3. International Response to the Crisis of Internal Displacement in the Sudan 
 
Because of the size and length of the conflict in the Sudan it is impossible to conduct 
a full examination of the international community’s response in this paper. This 
section will, therefore, focus on the most recent events, namely the conflict in Darfur. 
Shortly after the beginning of the conflict many observers indicated that the situation 
could develop into one of the worst humanitarian crises in the world.310 However, 
despite early warnings the situation in Darfur only made it onto the agenda of the 
Security Council in April 2004. Following a briefing on the humanitarian situation in 
Darfur, the Council issued a presidential statement expressing deep concern about 
the massive humanitarian crisis.311 The Security Council called upon the parties to 
ensure the protection of civilians and to reach a ceasefire, which at the time was 
being negotiated under the auspices of the African Union (AU).312  
 A few days later the Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement between the 
Sudanese government and the rebels was signed.313 In accordance with the 
agreement, the AU established a Ceasefire Commission to monitor the 
implementation of the ceasefire.314 However, the violence did not halt.315
In June 2004, the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1547 
which called upon the parties to use their influence to bring the fighting in Darfur to 
an end. It also welcomed the efforts of the African Union.316 More decisive action 
was eventually taken in July 2004. In Resolution 1556 the Security Council 
condemned: 
 
‘all acts of violence and violations of human rights and international 
humanitarian law by all parties to the crisis … including 
indiscriminate attacks on civilians, rapes, forced displacements and 
acts of violence especially those with an ethnic dimension and 
[expressed] its utmost concern at the consequences of the conflict 
in Darfur on the civilian population, including women, children and 
internally displaced persons.’317
                                                 
310 A documantation of Human Rights Watch is available at www.hrw.org/doc/?t=africa&c=sudan.  
311 SC/8050, 2 April 2004. 
312 SC/8050, 2 April 2004. 
313 The agreement is available at www.usip.org/library/pa/sudan_ceasefire_04082004.html.  
314 See Article 3 of the Ceasefire Agreement. 
315 International Crisis Group (236). 
316 S/Res/1547 (2004) para. 6. 
317 S/Res/1556 (2004). 
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 In the end, it deemed the situation a threat to international peace and 
security.318 Accordingly, the Security Council could have authorized a humanitarian 
intervention to end the crisis in Darfur. Its actions, however, stopped far from it. The 
Council confined itself to consider further actions, including measures provided 
under Article 41 of the U.N. Charter if the Sudanese government failed to disarm the 
pro-government militia.319 Article 41 of the U.N. Charter provides for measures 
falling short of the use of force such as economic sanctions.320 The reason why the 
Security Council did not take a stronger stand is the reluctance of some of its 
members to endorse such a stand. Many have blamed the Chinese interest in 
preserving its lucrative oil contracts in Sudan as the underlying reason.321 Moreover, 
Russia was accused to impede stronger action fearing that this may terminate its 
valuable arms sales.322
 The Sudanese government failed to disarm the militia but instead transferred 
parts of them into the police and armed forces.323 However, the Security Council did 
not follow up on the threat of further measures under Chapter VII of the U.N. 
Charter, most likely because its members, for the above mentioned reasons, could 
not agree on doing so. It has done something novel instead. In March 2005 it 
adopted Resolution 1593 which again declared the situation in Darfur to be a threat 
to international peace and security.324 Acting under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter 
the Council refered the situation in Darfur to the Prosecutor of the International 
Criminal Court, thereby underlining the gravity of the situation.325 As explored in 
chapter two, the Security Council can refer situations even if the country involved is 
not a party to the ICC Statute. Therefore, it is of no relevance that the Sudan has, as 
pointed out earlier, not ratified the ICC Statute.  
                                                 
318 S/Res/1556 (2004). 
319 S/Res/1556 (2004) para. 6. 
320 See Article 41 of the U.N. Charter. 
321 See, for example, www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/sudanindex.htm and 
www.hrw.org/wr2k5/darfurandabughraib/2.htm.  
322 As regards other Security Council members, Human Rights Watch observed that: ‘Algeria and 
Pakistan have been models of Islamic solidarity, so long as that is defined as fealty to an Islamic 
government rather than commitment to the lives of Muslim victims. Other African members of the 
Council, Angola and Benin, placed premium on loyalty to a fellow African government.’ (no. 321). 
323 IDMC Internal Displacement Profile: Sudan (no. 238) 168. 
324 S/Res/1593 (2005). 
325 S/Res/1593 (2005) para. 1. 
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International criminal law provides for accountability for serious violations of 
humanitarian and human rights law. The prospect of accountability may help to 
prevent future violations of these laws. In the words of the Prosecutor of the ICC:  
  
‘The referral of the situation in Darfur to the Office of the Prosecutor 
has brought an international, independent and impartial justice 
component to the efforts to end the violence in Darfur. This 
component forms part of a collective international and regional 
effort to improve the security situation, ensure the provision of 
humanitarian assistance and the creation of conditions for the 
return of refugees and internally displaced persons.’326
 
On what scale the ICC’s involvement will, in practice, benefit the internally 
displaced remains to be seen. The Prosecutor’s statement, however, implies that it 
will only be a contribution to effectively putting an end to the violence in Darfur. A 
humanitarian intervention involving military presence in unsecure regions of Darfur 
would have greater potential to improve the situation of IDPs on the ground. In light 
of this it is regrettable that the Security Council has not authorized such intervention. 
Its ablility to provide the most effective form of protection to the internally displaced 
is after all, as asserted in chapter three, tied to the will of states. In the case of 
Darfur some states have put their self-interest above the common interest to uphold 













                                                 
326 Report of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Mr. Luis Moreno Ocampo, to the 





The question set forth at the outset of this paper was whether the internally 
displaced require enhanced protection. A closer look at the existing international 
standards has revealed that IDPs are, in theory, widely protected. However, theory 
does not reflect practice. The main reason for this divergence is that the states who 
bear the primary responsibility for ensuring these standards are unwilling to live up 
to their responsibility. In fact, more often than not, they constitute the cause behind 
the need for protection in the first place. As such, it can be concluded that IDPs are 
in need of enhanced protection and it is apparent that such protection can only be 
effectively provided by the international community. 
In recent years, there has been a growing trend on the part of the 
international community to respond to situations when individuals are suffering at the 
hands of their own government. To this end it has employed interventions which can 
be legally undertaken with the authorization of the Security Council. Since the end of 
the Cold War, obtaining such authorization has become a real possibility. However, 
while the international community has the means to react to humanitarian 
catastrophes these means are, to date and to the detriment of the internally 
displaced, not employed consistently. This can be attributed to the fact that the 
protection of humanitarian and human rights standards often plays second fiddle to 
domestic self-interest.  
As long as the effective implementation of humanitarian and human rights 
standards cannot be assured, the crisis of internal displacement will continue to 
haunt the international community. It is safe to say that the aspiration of David 
Scheffer, quoted at the outset of the paper, has not materialized. On the contrary, 
and in the words of the Secretary-General: 
 
“the desperate plight of tens of millions of persons displaced 
within the borders of their own countries poses one of the greatest 
challenges of our time.”327   




                                                 
327 Kofi Annan, Secretary-General of the United Nations. In an appraisal of Exodus Within Borders. 
See at the back of the book (no. 14). 
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